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Purpose:   This study aims at proving the impact of firm-specific financial 
determinants on the likelihood of cross-border M&A and their 
impact on the relative size of transactions, both against the 
background of changing market conditions. 
Methodology:   The study applies a quantitative approach based on secondary 
data, using several regression models: a linear regression 
specification and a series of binary-response models  
Theoretical Perspectives: The theoretical framework gives an overview over FDI 
determinants with a distinct focus on the OLI framework and 
firm-specific financial factors, as suggested by Forssbæck and 
Oxelheim (2008, a, b and c). In addition, importance of financial 
market conditions on merger activity is outlined. All aspects 
lead to our hypotheses.   
Empirical foundation:  The research is based on a set of four samples in two different 
time periods, including listed non-financial companies of 10 
countries within the eurozone and their cross-border M&A 
Conclusions: In conclusion, we find our first hypothesis, that the strength of 
single firm-specific financial factors increases the likelihood of 
firm‘s to undertake cross-border M&A, to be confirmed. Altered 
financial market conditions indeed impact which factors are 
determining this propensity. 
In addition, we find our second hypothesis, that the strength of 
single firm-specific financial factors increases the relative 
transaction size of cross-border M&A, to be confirmed. Altered 
financial market conditions strongly impact which factors are 
determining the size. 
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1 Introduction 
1. Introduction 
The analysis of reasons underlying a firm‘s decision to invest in foreign countries has become 
an important area of scientific research over the last decades. Foreign direct investments 
(FDI) are generally defined as ―the category of international investment that reflects the 
objective of a resident entity in one economy obtaining a lasting interest in an enterprise 
resident in another economy‖ (Balance of Payment Manual, 1993, p.86). As regards the 
determinants explaining this objective, many different influencing aspects, such as the firm‘s 
economic condition, its industry, and economic, political and financial market environment 
have already been identified and subject to econometrical research.  
 However, Oxelheim et al. (2001) and Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008a, b and c; 2011) 
highlight that research so far provides only a one-sided view on the topic of FDI determinants. 
They criticize its ―focus on real side factors, whereas the financial side of the firm is ignored, 
or allotted a menial role for the FDI decisions‖ (2008a, p.2). Hence, they suggest granting 
more importance to the analysis of the firm-specific financial ownership dimension of FDI 
decisions, arguing that the likelihood of a firm undertaking FDI is influenced by its financial 
condition. This hypothesis is proved relevant in two related econometric studies conducted by 
Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008, a, b and c; 2011). 
 Based on these findings by Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008, a, b and c; 2011), this 
paper aims at extending the current research in this particular area with a distinct focus on 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&A), which represent one specific type of FDI. The 
research contribution is directed towards two areas of interest, with prevailing lacks of 
research. Firstly, a partial replication of Forssbæck and Oxelheim‘s (2008, a, b and c) studies 
is conducted to test if their findings are stable in altering financial market environments. 
Hence, the assumption that the strength of firm-specific financial determinants increases the 
likelihood of cross-border M&A is addressed (Hypothesis I). Secondly, we formulate an 
additional hypothesis, reasoning that the strength of the same financial determinants also 
positively influences a firm‘s capacity to engage in relatively large cross-border M&A 
(Hypothesis 2), which is also assessed in altered financial market environments.  
The strength of a firm‘s financial determinants is discussed as (1) having a low cost of 
equity, (2) having a low cost of debt and/or a favorable credit rating, (3) being able to 
generate internal funds and increase them by negotiating tax breaks, and (4) having access to 
competitively priced equity. For the definition of variables used as proxies for the financial 
factors and the overall econometrical approach, we take Forssbæck and Oxelheim‘s (2008a, b 
and c) papers as our point of departure. Hence, we apply a number of binary-response 
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regressions to test the first hypothesis, whereas the second hypothesis is analyzed with the 
help of linear regressions. Both analyses are based on samples comprising non-financial 
eurozone firms and their cross-border M&As. 
Our results regarding Hypothesis I suggest strong support for Forssbæck and 
Oxelheim‘s (2008, a and b) findings that financial determinants are crucial for the propensity 
of companies to undertake cross-border M&A. In particular, we identify a pronounced 
significance of the cost of equity proxies and internal funds for an increased likelihood of 
undertaking cross-border M&A. Moreover, the equity effect is robust to changes in the macro 
environment, whereas internal funds are influenced by altered market conditions regarding 
their explanatory power of M&A likelihood. Concerning Hypothesis II, the results indicate 
that financial determinants are also important for a firm‘s capability to engage in relatively 
large cross-border M&A transactions. Again, significance is highest for cost of equity proxies, 
however not in both market environments. Moreover, the relevance of other firm-specific 
financial variables varies by market environment and the respective hypothesis tested.  
Overall, our analyses confirm that the strength of firm-specific financial factors indeed 
impacts a firm‘s decision to undertake cross-border M&A and its capability to conduct 
relatively large transactions.  
The article is organized in the following way. The next section gives an overview over 
the existing body of literature regarding FDI determinants. In section 3 the two hypotheses are 
introduced. In section 4, the applied methodology is described. Section 5, subsequently, 
outlines the data set and variable definitions, as well as the basic sample statistics. Next, 
section 6 presents the results of the empirical analysis, before finally, section 7 summarizes 
the previous findings, presents conclusions and gives suggestions for further research. 
  
  
 
3 Literature Review 
2. Literature Review 
The literature and research on factors influencing a firm‘s decision to invest or acquire 
companies abroad is very extensive. Nevertheless, to our best knowledge, no single theory has 
yet been developed to comprehensively explain the relevant factors, due to the complexity of 
the subject. Instead, several theories strive to at least partially explain circumstances under 
which firm‘s take FDI into consideration. In the following, we first give an overview about 
general aspects that have been analyzed and identified as determinants of FDI. In addition, the 
Ownership-Location-Internalization (OLI)-paradigm is described to present a more 
comprehensive perspective on FDI determinants, before introducing firm-specific financial 
ownership factors, which embody a specific extension of the OLI framework. Further, 
financial market environment as an additional determinant of cross-border M&A is 
considered. On basis of this review, we identify existing research gaps before articulating our 
contribution to fill these gaps. 
2.1 Determinants of FDI 
In his early paper on the nature of the firm, Coase (1937) established the idea that the 
internalization of market transactions can be less costly for firms than having contracts with 
external parties due to inefficiencies in the market. According to Kindleberger (1969), Caves 
(1971) and Hymer (1976), this thought can also be applied to FDI. Hence, FDI is more likely 
if firms have internal advantages – so called ‗monopolistic advantages‘ – that can compensate 
for high costs and risks implied when producing abroad. Lall (1980) tested the viability of 
these monopolistic advantages and found evidence that technology intensity, product 
differentiation and scale effects are reasons for US firms to undertake FDI. 
Besides these factors, other research focused on ownership-specific factors such as 
market power, research and development (R&D) and advertising intensity, managerial and 
technical skills, experience, capital intensity, knowledge intensity, and firm size. Especially 
firm size has been identified as an imperative determinant increasing the likelihood of FDI 
(among others Horst, 1972; Caves, 1974; Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; Trevino and Grosse, 
2002).Knowledge intensity is a further important factor, recognized by Buckley and Casson 
(1976) and later supported by Markusen (1984). The latter established the well-known 
knowledge-capital model, showing that especially knowledge-intensive firms can benefit 
from having a multi-plant structure, since intangible assets can more easily be transferred 
between plants with almost no additional costs.  
  
 
4 Literature Review 
Regarding FDI by manufacturing firms, Ray (1989) identified the significance of 
industrial factors such as industry size, industry growth and market concentration, explaining 
the FDI decision of a firm, and thereby, among others, extending the mere firm-specific focus 
with an industrial component. 
Besides firm- and industry-related determinants, also economic, political and financial 
market characteristics have been considered to influence FDI. Research in the area of 
economic home and host country factors has focused on many different variables. These 
include market size, gross national product (GNP) per capita, market growth trends, real GNP 
growth, inflation, export GNP growth, balance of payments deficit, labor costs, skilled 
workforce and education, labor market flexibility and disturbances, infrastructure, and 
competitiveness (Faeth, 2009). Goldberg (1972) could find evidence for the growth-related 
factors for FDI in the US. However, he could not unfold support for market size effects. In 
contrast, Cheng and Kwan (2000) for China, and Barell and Pain (1996) for the US, among 
others, showed that market size, infrastructure, production and transportation costs, as well as 
wage levels seem to have a positive impact on the likelihood of FDI. In particular, market size 
is one of the most supported determinants for FDI.  
 The analyzed political (or regulatory) factors include institutions, political instability, 
government ideology, regime type, regime duration, property rights index, average ratio of 
protection/legal protection of assets, corruption, bilateral and multilateral aid, tariff rates and 
trade barriers, taxes and subsidies, incentives of host countries (fiscal, financial, investment, 
and others), and performance requirements (Faeth, 2009). Tariff barriers, in particular, were 
analyzed by different researchers. However, while Culem (1988) found tariff barriers as a 
significant explanatory variable for FDI, Moore (1993) failed to unfold support when 
conducting his study on German firms. However, Biswas (2002) showed that the regime type 
and quality of the property rights index of a country increase FDI activity. Research on taxes 
has become quite comprehensive with a wide range of conflicting findings on the real effects 
and the ability of firms to influence (double-)taxation through an FDI decision (Blonigen, 
2005). Moreover, Haufler and Wooton (1999) found that even when tax incentives are 
important to a certain degree, the market size of the target‘s country still is more relevant for 
FDI decisions of multinational enterprises (MNE), lowering the stand-alone importance of tax 
incentives significantly. With regards to incentives provided by the host country, Loree and 
Guisinger (1995) found evidence that investment incentives increased the likelihood of FDI in 
certain countries, which was supported by Bond and Samuelson (1986). However, they also 
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unfolded negative effects of performance requirements and host country tax rates on FDI 
activity (once again presenting a different tax-effect than other researchers). Schneider and 
Frey (1985), as well as Loree and Guisinger (1995), among others, showed that combined 
economic and political factors are more significant in explaining FDI than each aspect 
separately. 
As regards financial market factors, especially exchange rate effects, but also interest 
rate risks, crisis-related exchange rate swings, expectations about upcoming exchange rate 
developments and a country‘s capital endowments, are analyzed.  The most cited work with 
regards to the financial market focus is Froot and Stein‘s (1991) analysis of exchange rate 
effects on FDI. They investigated an increase in FDI activity based on a currency 
appreciation, thereby introducing the idea of imperfect capital markets. Their findings on the 
importance of exchange rate effects are supported by several other studies (e.g. Harris and 
Ravenscraft, 1991; Klein and Rosengren, 1994; Blonigen, 1997; Trevino and Grosse, 2002), 
whereas Barell and Pain (1996) rather found evidence for a postponement of FDI in case of an 
appreciation. Furthermore, Canals and Noguer (2007) found positive correlations between 
FDI and capital scarcity of host countries, but also proved that a minimum of capital 
endowments in the host country is necessary to attract FDI. Nevertheless, these findings are 
very much focused on the reactive aspect of a firm‘s exploitation of favorable financial 
market conditions for its investment decision. The proactive management of a firm‘s financial 
condition related to an FDI decision is discussed later in section 2.3. 
Finally, further studies added other factors to the field of research on FDI 
determinants. With regards to the trade effect argument, which is based on the traditional idea 
of substituting costs related to exports by entering the foreign market directly, Head et al. 
(1995) identified the importance of vertical relationships for cross-border acquisitions of 
Japanese firms (e.g. the firm and its suppliers). In a more recent study, Canals and Noguer 
(2007) showed that geographic distance is negatively correlated to FDI, whereas a common 
language between the acquirer and target‘s country has positive effects on FDI, referring to 
the region-specific factors introduced by Buckley and Casson (1976). Moreover, they found 
positive correlations between firm size and FDI, supporting earlier findings. Rugman (1980) 
related the existence of MNEs to the aim of risk diversification, arguing that firms reduce 
profit volatility by serving different markets and offering a variety of products. Hughes et al. 
(1975), among others, had an empirical focus on this strategic risk management idea and 
found broad evidence supporting Rugman‘s hypothesis. A study by Baltagi et al. (2007) 
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introduced the idea that neighboring countries‘ characteristics could influence MNEs‘ 
decisions to conduct FDI in certain target countries. However, evidence on this issue is rather 
limited. 
 
To sum up, our literature review shows that existing research on FDI determinants 
covers a variety of different areas, although we do not claim that our is exhaustive in any way.  
Some aspects, such as firm size, knowledge intensity, target country size and exchange rate 
effects have been identified as influential factors for FDI decisions by econometric studies, 
while other factors, such as influence of tax issues, remain debated.  
2.2 The OLI-paradigm 
As shown, the breadth of research on FDI determinants is enormous. Hence, some economists 
tried to set up more comprehensive theories, for example Dunning (1977, 2001, 2008), who 
established the OLI-paradigm. It combines ownership advantages with location factors and 
the idea of internalization, thereby providing a framework of standard FDI determinants, as 
exemplified in graph 1 below.  
 
Graph 1: Components of the OLI-paradigm, suggested by Dunning (1977) 
Dunning (1977) based his theory on the thought that firms can benefit from 
ownership-specific advantages such as size, skills and resources, being individual 
endowments of firms, and from location-specific advantages such as resources, infrastructure 
and institutions, which are individual endowments of countries. Taking this idea into 
consideration, he concluded that foreign production is most likely to occur when location-
Ownership
Location
Internali-
zation
FDI 
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specific capabilities of a host country are advantageous, while ownership-specific capabilities 
are more favorable in a home country‘s firm. This said, labor may be cheaper in developing 
than in developed countries, but a firm originating from a developed country may have better 
abilities to exploit the positive effects of cheap labor than host country firms. The third 
component which Dunning (1977) added to his theory, internalization, eventually 
differentiates between types of FDI activity. While ownership- and location-specific 
advantages could also be exploited via alliances or joint ventures, Dunning (1977) pointed out 
the importance of internalization of country-specific advantages into the firm to 
comprehensively exploit all given opportunities. For him, multi-nationality of a firm leads, 
generally speaking, to a better competitive position of the firm, since it can take advantage of 
all the locations it is positioned in. Thus, internalization is an important reason for M&A. 
However, since internalization is costly and risky, firms will not engage in M&A but rather in 
joint ventures or alliances, if incentives to internalize are not strong enough.  
2.3 Financial Ownership Advantages 
Although research on FDI determinants is very extensive, analysis of firm-specific financial 
ownership aspects, i.e. the proactive management of a firm‘s financial condition and their 
influence on the decision to undertake FDI is rather limited as is raised by Oxelheim et al. 
(2001). They acknowledged the benefit of the OLI-paradigm in explaining FDI in providing a 
rather comprehensive framework concerning FDI determinants, However, they criticized the 
assumption made by Dunning (1977) and Caves (1974), among others, that better access to 
funds is solely a side effect of firm size. They rather highlighted the thought that ―a firm‘s 
financial strength affects its ability to engage in foreign direct investment‖ (Oxelheim et al., 
2001, p.3) and that the firm can actively influence its own financial strength. This follows the 
underlying assumption that financial markets are segmented internationally, meaning that not 
in all countries companies are provided with the same access to capital and that, further, not 
all companies are provided with the same abilities to make use of capital market conditions. 
Based on this assumption, the authors identified reactive and proactive behavior as 
mechanisms to realize financial strategies. The core of reactive behavior has already been 
mentioned earlier in the discussion of exchange rate effects on FDI, where firms try to exploit 
advantages that certain financial market conditions offer to them.  
In contrast, since firms may e.g. be restricted in terms of market liquidity within their 
home markets, proactive behavior seeks to either create financial advantages or eliminate 
financial disadvantages a firm has compared to both domestic and international competitors. 
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Hence, strategies aimed at increasing the financial strength of the firm will improve a firm‘s 
likelihood to undertake FDI. In their paper, Oxelheim et al. (2001) set up eight basic aspects 
on how firms can proactively engage in a financial strategy. These include (1) the firms‘ 
access to competitively priced equity, (2) cross-listings in a prominent and liquid financial 
market, (3) the application of globally recognized disclosure standards (bonding), (4) the 
choice of one of the prestigious international financial institutions as advisor, (5) the firm‘s 
credit rating, (6) the ability to negotiate lower taxes or subsidies, (7) the reduction of financial 
monitoring costs, and (8) the reduction of financial and operating exposures. With this 
approach, the authors extend the traditional OLI framework by including an explicit financial 
component to the ownership-specific advantages, as illustrated in graph 2 below.  
 
Graph 2: Components of the OLI-paradigm, suggested by Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2001) 
In a first econometric analysis, Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008, a and b) tested the 
impact of some of these firm-specific financial factors on cross-border M&As completed in 
2000. In particular, they focused on factors regarding the reduction of the cost of capital 
and/or the increase of the availability of funds, since, according to them, these factors 
generate a financial advantage for firms. They found a significant effect on FDI stemming 
from the aspects related to equity financing (cross-listing in a more liquid market and lower 
cost of equity). This is in line with an analysis made by Tolmunen and Torstila (2005), who 
identified cross-listing as a factor which increases the likelihood of cross-border M&A. 
However, this latter study did not conclude that cross-listing itself directly impacts the 
acquisition decision. Rather, they highlighted the fact that cross-listing is part of the 
Location
Internali-
zation
Non-financial 
Ownership 
Financial 
Ownership FDI 
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globalization strategy of firms, indicating that the strategic decision to undertake FDI is made 
prior to the cross-listing decision. This conclusion is based on the results found by Pagano et 
al. (2002) that firm size and globalization are the most significant variables in the explanation 
of cross-listing activity. Nevertheless, all results show that cross-listing increases liquidity and 
especially shares listed in the US seem to be a better currency for financing cross-border 
M&A in particular in the US, than stocks listed in smaller, less liquid markets. Another aspect 
concerning cross-listing is that it can be used as part of a bonding strategy to increase 
reputation and visibility of firms, and hence cannot only be attributed to a subsequent FDI. 
Interestingly, an article by Dobbs and Goedhart (2008) shows a significant decrease in cross-
listing activity since 2002, both in the US and UK, although FDI increased further. This effect 
can be traced back to several influences such as the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
2002 (which increased the costs associated to listings) or the increased size / liquidity of 
capital markets worldwide (Dobbs and Goedhart (2008). The latter reason has already been 
anticipated by Pagano et al. (2002), who reasoned that once differences in financial market 
sizes decrease, the necessity for cross-listing will decline. Hence, a test of significance of the 
cross-listing determinant on FDI activity in more recent years could find less explicit results.  
In contrast to the significance of cross-listing, the results of Forssbæck and Oxelheim 
(2008, a and b) related to the cost of debt and internal financing hypotheses were statistically 
insignificant, whereas non-financial ownership determinants such as size and knowledge-
intensity were approved to increase the likelihood of FDI. In the second, continuative study, 
Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008c; 2011) combined the ownership (both financial and non-
financial) and location perspective of the OLI paradigm by additionally taking home and host 
country market conditions into consideration. They found that in this setting, a more proactive 
approach in terms of a financial strategy in general (cost of equity and debt) is identifiable. In 
particular, this finding is true for firms originating in countries with less liquid financial 
markets, thus supporting the idea of an influence of the location dimension on the financing 
strategy.  
2.4 Financial market environment 
The previously described frameworks such as the OLI framework provide a basis and a 
theoretical explanation for a firm‘s decision to take on the increased risk of a cross-border 
M&A in comparison to domestic M&As, although none of these paradigms can explain the 
occurrence of FDI comprehensively, as already stated. The OLI framework focuses on the 
individual firm. In contrast, on a broader level, M&A have always occurred in the form of 
  
 
10 Literature Review 
waves, representing the aggregated M&A activity among firms in different industries during a 
certain period of time. Since the first big merger wave in the beginning of the 20
th
 century, a 
number of further waves followed, each with distinctive characteristics and magnitude. 
Whereas the primary waves are typified as being about horizontal and vertical integration or 
diversification on a national level, firms also started to orientate themselves internationally in 
the 1980s. In the course of the progressing globalization, cross-border M&A became 
increasingly important and the fifth merger wave, encompassing the years 1992-2004, was 
dominated by international deals (Gaughan, 2007). 
Global FDI flows, driven mainly by cross-border M&A activity, displayed a solid 
growth since 1991, peaking in the years 1999/2000, with sharply increasing levels 
(UNCTAD, 2002). However, from 2000 to 2001 flows fell by more than 50 percent 
worldwide, although the FDI volume in 2001 was still higher than in 1998 and added up to a 
value of USD 696 billion. Reasons for this dive of FDI can be traced back to two factors 
(UNCTAD, 2002, 2003). First, the major industrial economies were facing a general 
slowdown of economic activity. Second, these economies exhibited also a decreased stock 
market activity. The underlying aspect for these developments was the crisis which was 
triggered by the burst of the so called dot-com- or NASDAQ tech-bubble in the second 
quarter of 2000 after years of steady rise in stock prices. M&A activity in general increased 
substantially during the bubble, i.e. in the period between 1997 and 2000, at a rate of up to 95 
percent in the high-tech sector (Aharon et al., 2010) and fell considerably at the time of the 
burst and during the following recession. Although the tech bubble mainly referred to dot-
com companies, i.e. high-growth, innovative technological companies, the consequences of its 
burst were not confined to the tech sector: Anderson et al. (2010) found spillover effects in the 
stock market also affecting other industries, such as manufacturing or trading. In other words, 
the circumstances in the aftermath of the bubble had market-wide effects. This helps to 
explain the reduced FDI flows not only in the technology section but also in other industries.  
The stated factors that triggered the diminished levels of FDI flows were also 
discovered by Skovgaard Poulsen and Hufbauer (2011), who analyzed FDI during the more 
recent crisis of 2008-2009. They add liquidity constraints and alert attitudes among investors 
and managers to the mentioned reasons for the decreased appetite of MNEs on investing 
abroad. Although the dot-com bubble did not result in a similar crisis regarding its dimension 
and global consequences, the findings of Skovgaard Poulsen and Hufbauer (2011) might 
nevertheless also be valid for the recession in the aftermath of the 2001 asset burst. Reason is 
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that the circumstances triggered by a recession, be it severe as in 2008-2009 or less harsh as 
the dot-com recession, are not specific for any type of crisis, but lie rather in the nature of 
recessions and stock market crises.  
The effects of liquidity constraints have also been examined by other studies. 
According to Harford (2005), merger waves are determined by capital cycles in terms of the 
funding overall available at capital markets. In other words, capital liquidity is an imperative 
factor for the occurrence of M&A (supporting the importance of financial factors for the FDI 
decision). This is valid for all types of external financing, since equity and credit markets are 
highly correlated. Related to this, Fazzari et al. (1988) found that macroeconomic effects of 
shocks to liquidity, reducing a company‘s access to competitively priced financing, are 
exacerbated by constraints in capital markets. Since a crisis might result in more cautious 
attitudes among investors, and thus funds are not easily available anymore, these capital 
constraints are probably more severe in times of crises.  
The alert attitudes of managers and investors after the burst of a bubble are reflected in 
the findings of Aharon et al. (2010). They state that investors are inclined to rely on future 
expectations for valuations during the bubble and the bursting of the bubble, which indicates a 
disposition to take more risk during the euphoric bubble period. In contrast, after the bursting 
and during the subsequent crisis, investors tend to value projects rather with the help of 
current earnings and thus, rely on more certain information, as a consequence of their 
increased precaution. This indicates that during a bubble, managers may tend to evaluate 
projects in a very euphoric and possibly overly optimistic way, leading to high FDI activity in 
general, whereas in the aftermath of a bubble burst, they are less inclined to take the risk 
associated with FDI due to more conservative valuations or targets, and hence, FDI activity in 
general during recessions was found to be lower.  
Another interesting finding of Aharon et al. (2010) is that the pricing of M&A itself 
seems to remain unaffected from altered market conditions. A reason could be that the 
decision to engage in FDI indeed is influenced by financial constraints, euphoric atmosphere 
among investors and other market conditions, however, once a firm has decided to undertake 
an M&A, the pricing is dependent on other factors than the market situation. The underlying 
idea is that a firm decides to undertake an M&A deal only if it is capable to do so. 
 
It has been shown that the conditions of financial markets have a strong impact on FDI 
activity of firms on a macro level. Economic crises influence both firm‘s access to capital and 
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hence their ability to engage in investments, as well as their attitude towards certain 
investments, while the absolute transaction size appears not to be affected.  
2.5 Contribution to existing research 
As the previous literature review showed, many different aspects are relevant when 
conducting analyses regarding the determinants of a firm‘s FDI decision. Having tested the 
effect of financial ownership advantages on FDI, Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008, a and b) 
closed an important gap in existing research. Creating a bridge between traditional OLI-based 
FDI determinants and firm-specific financial factors, they show that financial factors matter to 
understand a firm‘s FDI decision.  
However, research on firm-specific financial factors has yet not been all-embracing 
and can be extended in many different certain directions. For example, supporting the stability 
of Forssbæck and Oxelheim‘s (2008, a and b) findings in different market environments 
would enhance the findings‘ general validity. This is relevant in particular, since Forssbæck 
and Oxelheim‘s (2008, a, b and c; 2011) analysis was conducted for cross-border M&As in 
the year 2000, the peak of the dot-com bubble. Thus, the significance of financial 
determinants (especially the significance of cross-listing) might have been overvalued in this 
period due to external financial market conditions, as described above. Moreover, altering 
financial market conditions, in general, can cause different funding sources to be more 
attractive than others, and hence might affect which firm-specific financial factors have an 
impact on cross-border M&A likelihood. Hence, testing the authors‘ hypothesis in another 
economic environment does provide interesting new insights.    
Furthermore, to assess the significance of firm-specific financial factors on the 
transaction size of cross-border M&A‘s constitutes a valuable amplification of the analysis of 
the mere decision by a firm to undertake cross-border M&A. Although this aspect is not 
directly related to the analysis of FDI determinants per se, it can still be seen as additional 
proof of the findings regarding firm-specific financial factors. The underlying assumption in 
this respect is that being in more favorable financial conditions enables firms to undertake 
larger transactions. Hence, among those firms conducting cross-border M&A, the significance 
of strong financial factors could be more strongly pronounced the larger the relative deal size 
is.   
 To conclude, we examined two existing research gaps: (1) an analysis of the impact of 
financial market circumstances on the importance of firm-specific financial factors for a 
firm‘s FDI decision and (2) an analysis of the influence of firm-specific financial factors on 
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relative transaction size. Hence, those will be the focal points of this paper‘s analysis, thereby 
we strive to close the identified research gap in these areas.  
3. Hypotheses 
Based on the previous review, we identified the two focal points we want to add to existing 
research on FDI determinants, as has been indicated. To investigate these points in a 
quantitative approach we formulate and test the following two hypotheses: 
H1: The strength of firm-specific financial factors increases the likelihood of firms 
to undertake cross-border M&A. 
H2: The strength of firm-specific financial factors increases the relative transaction 
 size of cross-border M&A.  
 Hypothesis I refers back to the theory on financial ownership advantages brought up 
by Oxelheim et al. (2001), and the subsequent econometric studies on firm-specific financial 
factors and their influence on the likelihood of undertaking FDI by Forssbæck and Oxelheim 
(2008, a, b and c), as outlined before. Firm-specific financial factors include the firm‘s cost of 
capital (cost of equity and cost of debt, including the rating), and its access to internal and 
external funding. These can be influenced by a firm‘s financial strategy, which comprises 
special means such as cross-listing in more liquid capital markets, and the exploitation / 
negotiation of tax breaks. The strength of financial factors in this context is equivalent to their 
positive influence on the capability of the firm to undertake acquisitions. Thus, we expect that 
a firm with low cost of capital and good access to financial liquidity is more likely to 
undertake cross-border M&A.  
Hypothesis I embodies our general assumption as regards the relation between the 
strength of firm-specific financial factors and the likelihood of cross-border M&A. However, 
as the financial market environment changes, also the strength of firm-specific financial 
factors will be influenced, e.g. economic downturns leading to capital constraints. Hence, we 
expect a change of circumstances in financial market conditions to be reflected in the impact 
of specific financial determinants on the likelihood of firm‘s undertaking cross-border M&A.  
 
Hypothesis II articulates our supposition that the strength of firm-specific financial 
factors not only increases the likelihood of cross-border M&A per se, but also its relative 
transaction size. This is based on the idea that lower cost of capital and better access to funds 
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improve the firm‘s capability to carry out those deals that were previously not possible to be 
realized. In line with this argument, we assume that the bigger the transaction size relative to 
the acquirer‘s size, the more likely it is that a proactive financial strategy was implemented 
prior to the cross-border M&A to improve the strength of the financial factors. In other words, 
we expect that advantageous conditions of firm-specific financial factors increase the relative 
transaction size of cross-border M&A. 
Hypothesis II embodies our general assumption about the relation between the 
strength of firm-specific financial factors and the relative transaction size of cross-border 
M&A. However, as the financial market environment changes, also the strength of firm-
specific financial factors will be influenced. Hence, we expect, in analogy to Hypothesis I, a 
change of circumstances in financial market conditions to be reflected in the impact of 
specific financial determinants on the relative transaction size of cross-border M&A.  
4. Methodology  
The applied methodology in this paper to test the outlined hypotheses adopts the 
methodological approach utilized by Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008a), with the exception of 
some modifications and changes, which will be addressed in detail.  
4.1 General model construction 
Generally speaking, the formulated hypotheses are tested within the framework of the OLI-
paradigm with regards to the internal dimensions, namely ownership advantages, location 
advantages and internalization advantages. In line with Forssbæck and Oxelheim‘s (2008, a 
and b), this framework is used to add explicitly firm-specific financial factors as part of the 
ownership advantages. However, the OLI framework is only used to a limited extent, since 
the internalization aspect is only implicitly assumed by considering cross-border M&As and 
excluding other forms of internalization activity, such as licensing. Furthermore, in contrast to 
Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008, a and b), we do not include the location dimension, i.e. the 
characteristics and conditions of the host country, due to the implied statistical complexity. In 
other words, the target of FDI deal is not of primary interest, but rather the decision to 
conduct a cross-border M&A per se.  
The general specification applied in order to test for the formulated hypotheses is an 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model, hence a linear regression approach, since we 
expect a linear relation between the independent and dependent variables (cf. Brooks, 2008).   
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yt = α + βxt + ut,              (1) 
 with 
 yt: dependent variable which is explained by the independent variable  
 α: constant term (intercept) 
 β: coefficient of the independent variable xt (regressor) 
 xt: independent variable explaining the dependent variable 
 ut: error term 
 
As noted before, it is not assumed that only one single factor influences the respective 
dependent variables (i.e. the likelihood of a cross-border M&A in the first hypothesis and 
relative transaction size in the second hypothesis), but rather a variety of different firm-
specific financial and traditional non-financial factors along with additional control 
parameters. Therefore, the formulated equation (1) is extended by the specified factors. A 
detailed explanation about the variables is given in the next section.  
After combining the firm-specific financial and non-financial ownership factors, and 
the control variables to separate vectors, the resulting baseline regression equation, underlying 
to all further analyses, takes the following form: 
 
yi = α + β‘ Fi + δ‘ Ni + π‘Cik + εik           (2) 
with 
 F: finance-specific ownership variables 
 N: non-financial FDI determinants (traditional ownership variables) 
 C: control variables representing industries and countries of origin 
 ε: error term 
The remaining components of the specification are the intercept (α) and coefficients of 
the independent variables (β‘, δ‘ and π‘). The indices specify the companies (i) in the 
respective home-countries (k). 
This specification holds for both formulated hypotheses, since widely the same 
regressors are assumed to determine each dependent variable.  
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4.2 Model construction first hypothesis 
In order to test the first hypothesis, which claims that the likelihood of realizing cross-border 
M&A is influenced by the independent variables, the specified baseline regression (2) is 
modified to the extent that the dependent variable yi is formulated as ACQik, defined as: 
 
  1 if ACQik* > 0 
ACQik =  
  0 in other cases 
 
Hence, a completion of a cross-border M&A is expressed as discretionary variable in 
the sense that it takes unit value if a deal was announced – and subsequently completed - i.e. it 
is an indicator or dummy variable.  
The specific regression to test Hypothesis I is as shown in specification (3) with the 
vectors of the independent variables being the same as previously defined: 
ACQik* = α + β‘ Fi + δ‘ Ni + π‘Cik + εik             (3) 
 However, since the dependent variable is a dummy variable and thus, conveys 
qualitative instead of quantitative information, a linear probability model is not appropriate to 
test the hypothesis. This is due to the OLS generating probabilities that are negative or higher 
than one, while this test is confined to an interval between zero and one. Alternatively, the 
logit and probit model can be used, since they alter the basic model to the extent that the 
values are pegged into the [0,1] interval. Both models assume different distributions: while 
the logit model suggests a cumulative logistic distribution, the probit model assumes a 
cumulative normal distribution. However, both models supposedly generate similar results, if 
the distribution of unit values zero and one is rather balanced, thus we use both to generate 
more profoundly supported results.    
4.3 Model construction second hypothesis 
In order to test the second hypothesis, which claims that the transaction size of FDI is 
influenced by the independent variables, the specified baseline regression (2) is modified to 
the extent that the dependent variable yi is formulated as RTSik. In contrast to the acquisition 
variable, the transaction size variable conveys quantitative information, and hence, takes on a 
definite value. A precise definition of the dependent variable is given below (section 5.3).  
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 The resulting equation takes the following form: 
RTSik = α + β‘ Fi + δ‘ Ni + π‘Cik + εik             (4)
  
The vectors of the independent variables are the same as previously defined, with the 
exception of the vector for non-financial ownership factors. It is adjusted to the extent that 
one variable is excluded, as described in the next section.   
4.4 Econometric tests  
In order to fulfill the requirements for OLS to deliver reliable estimates regarding the 
coefficients, a number of tests are applied.  
Tests regarding the independent variables encompass an analysis of the Pearson 
correlation matrix, which tests correlations among these variables. In addition, 
multicollinearity, which describes the correlation between more than two of the independent 
variables, is tested by means of the variance inflation factor (VIF) that quantifies the intensity 
of the multicollinearity. The occurrence of multicollinearity would result in the necessity to 
exclude one of the correlated variables so that the independence of the individual regressors 
can be ensured. Otherwise, the regression cannot be conducted properly. 
In order to ensure an adequate interpretation of the regression results, the 
characteristics of the residuals are analyzed, as well. Homoscedasticity of the residuals is 
controlled on the basis of the Breusch-Pagan Test (1979).  Homoscedasticity is given if the 
variances of the residuals are not significantly different. In the opposite case of 
heteroscedasticity, the standard error of the coefficients is not estimated correctly, which 
makes a proper interpretation of statistical significance problematic. Autocorrelation, the 
correlation of residuals, is tested with the Durbin-Watson Test (1950), and has similar 
consequences as heteroscedasticity. Finally, the normal distribution of residuals is tested via 
the Jarque-Bera Test (1980). This is necessary to ensure that the significance of the influence 
of regressors on the dependent variable can be interpreted correctly.      
The goodness of fit of the chosen models to describe the given relations is verified 
with several coefficients of determination. R² and adjusted R² are applied to the OLS 
regression, with the adjusted R² overcoming the limitations of R² to increase with the number 
of regressors. The goodness of probit and logit regressions is verified by means of the               
Mc Fadden pseudo R². The F-Test analyzes the significance of the independent variables 
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regarding an explanation of the dependent variable. The adequacy of the applied models is 
tested with Ramsey‘s RESET Test and the Hosmer-Lemeshow Test (1989), where the former 
is applied to the OLS model and the latter to the probit and logit models.  
5. Data set and variable definitions 
In this section the data set and its characteristics are described. Furthermore, the variables 
used to test the hypotheses are outlined.  
5.1 Data set 
In order to apply the methodology described in the previous section, we use several databases 
to generate a sample with specific characteristics. Our supposition that an altered financial 
market environment impacts the importance of financial factors on FDI likelihood and 
transaction volume is tested in analyzing cross-border M&As that were announced in the 
years 2000 and 2003. These two years are important turning points in the so called dot-com 
bubble. After a boom period, the year 2000 embodies both the peak of the bubble and its 
burst. The following years are characterized by the subsequent recession. The year 2003 
represents the trough of the economic cycle and marks the beginning of the rebound. In 
analyzing FDI activity before and after a bubble‘s burst, the influence of market conditions 
can be observed, since a bubble and a subsequent recession constitute an extreme change in 
the condition of a financial market. This helps to test the stability and applicability of our 
results in different environments. 
 
Regarding country and industry scope, the focus of analysis is confined to non-
financial, listed companies with headquarters in the eurozone. The limitation to non-financial 
firms is made due to the fact that financial companies have specific capital structures and are 
facing other regulations than non-financial companies. Moreover, only listed firms are 
selected in order to ensure better availability and adequacy of data. The requirement to be 
headquartered in the eurozone ensures a high degree of comparability among firms and 
transactions because acquirer data is reported in the same currency. The eurozone countries 
are defined as of 1999. Of the eleven founding members of the eurozone, ten are included in 
the sample, i.e. Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
Portugal and Spain. Firms headquartered in Luxembourg were included in the first place, 
however, after reducing the sample due to insufficient firm data, the number of firms from 
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Luxembourg was negligible, and hence, Luxembourg as country has been excluded. Greece, 
although having been a member of the eurozone since 2001, only fulfills the criterion for the 
second year of interest (2003), and thus, is not taken into account in neither of the periods in 
order to ensure comparable samples in both periods analyzed. Generally, two different 
samples, per hypothesis, are constructed: one cross-border M&A sample, only including 
acquirers fulfilling the mentioned criteria, and a broader sample consisting of all companies 
that have available data and fulfill the same criteria.  
With respect to cross-border M&A, i.e. the dependent variable to test Hypothesis I, the 
Zephyr database is utilized to retrieve information. After several limitations, outlined in the 
following, the sample consists of companies headquartered in one of the 10 previously 
defined eurozone countries that announced acquisitions of at least 50 percent of the target‘s 
shares in the year 2000 or 2003, respectively. The limitations are based on several criteria. 
First, only those transactions are taken into account, which are announced in the respective 
years of interest. Reason to refer to the announcement date instead of deal completion is that 
the financial strength is supposedly already prevalent at the time of a bid or an offer. 
However, in order to avoid tests and analyses for reasons of failure of certain bids and to 
ensure meaningful results with regards to the preceding financial strategy, only those 
announcements are considered that were subsequently completed. Second, the cross-border 
M&A deal needs to refer to an acquisition of at least 50 percent of the target. Cross-border 
M&A transactions involving acquisition stakes of less than 50 percent are excluded from the 
sample, i.e. only acquisitions of majority stakes are included. This ensures that small 
acquisitions, which rather represent capital investments than M&A transactions, are not 
considered. Moreover, only acquisitions without previous holdings are considered, hence 
step-wise acquisitions (if not conducted within one year) are excluded. We accept these 
limitations due in order to ensure that we can supposedly retrieve more meaningful 
information with regards to the prior financial development.  
Information about the financial factors, which constitute the independent variables, is 
retrieved with help of the database Datastream, supplemented by Osiris and Reuters Kobra. 
The retrieved data, a variety of company financials (balance sheet (B/S) and income statement 
(IS) items), covers two periods, comprising the years 1997 to 2000, and 2000 to 2003, 
respectively. Referring back to the dot-com bubble, these two periods involve all stages of the 
bubble and its subsequent crisis. The first period represents the euphoric bubble when stock 
prices were rising and FDI activity was supposedly high. The second period, in contrast, 
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marks the aftermath of the bubble‘s burst in 2000, and hence, encompasses the subsequent 
recession with strongly decreasing market prices and shrinking FDI activity. With this 
classification we adopt, to large extent, the approach utilized by Aharon et al. (2010).  
 
The NASDAQ index during these years displays this pattern, comprising the two 
periods (based on Yahoo Finance, 2011b), as can be seen in graph I below.  
 
Graph 3: NASDAQ Composite index 1995-2006 
This development was not only limited to the US index, but also affected other industries and 
regions, such as the European market. Although the peak and trough of the EuroStoxx 50 
Index are not as pronounced as for the NASDAQ Index, the general development can still be 
seen in graph II below (based on STOXX, 2011).  
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
U
S 
D
o
lla
r
year
  
 
21 Data set and variable definitions 
 
Graph 4: EuroStoxx 50 Index 1998-2006 
A comparison of the regression results for both periods will supposedly display the 
impact of the bubble and the aftermath of the asset burst on cross-border M&A activity.  
 As concluding and imperative step, Datastream and Zephyr samples are matched. The 
companies that appear in both samples, and hence have undertaken cross-border M&A, are 
earmarked for the final dependent variable of Hypothesis I, as indicated in the previous 
section. All other companies are assigned zero for their dependent variable. For the second 
hypothesis, only the earmarked companies are included in the analyzed sample.. 
5.2 Definition of independent variables  
In this section, the independent variables that form the vectors used in our regressions are 
described. The variable selection criteria are largely based on the approach applied by 
Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008, a and c) for the sake of comparability of both studies.  
The independent variables capture the firm-specific financial factors. In addition, non-
financial ownership variables, as suggested by the OLI-paradigm, are included in the 
regressions. Finally, control variables are introduced. An overview of the subsequently 
defined variables is given in the appendix (Exhibit 1).  
5.2.1 Firm-specific financial variables 
A firm‘s financial strength is dependent on (1) its cost of capital, which comprises the cost of 
equity and cost of debt and (2) its availability of funds, which refers to internal financing and 
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cross-listing. Therefore, it is essential to combine components of both dimensions in order to 
analyze the financial strength of a company.   
Firstly, an analysis of cost of capital  demands an individual examination of both 
components, cost of equity and cost of debt. As regards cost of equity, Tobin‘s q is a widely 
acknowledged proxy in the literature (see, for instance, Callen, 1988). In addition, we use the 
price/sales (P/S) ratio, based on year-end data, to account for the cost of equity financing. 
Both proxies were also used by Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008, a and c). They used the P/S 
ratio instead of the price/earnings (P/E) ratio, which is more commonly used, to avoid 
negative ratios to be caused by the earnings component (Forssbæck and Oxelheim, 2008a). 
Hence, the P/S ratio will generate better results in terms of usability for interpretation of the 
final regression results. We are aware that in fact Tobin‘s q and the P/S ratio alike are 
valuation measures rather than proxies for the real expenditures based on cost of equity. In 
particular, the market value based valuation measures used above, can be criticized for failing 
to include the risk dimension of cost of equity. This dimension could for example be included 
using alternative measures derived from market data such as the Capital Asset Pricing Model.  
Moreover, a decomposition of Tobin‘s q into an investment and finance component 
would help to identify the real impact that can be attributed to the financial dimension. This, 
in turn, would enable a more adequate interpretation as regards the true cost of equity effect. 
However, we abstain from conducting a separate analysis, but rather refer to the findings of 
Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008c). They conclude that the financing component is indeed 
significant for their analysis, and hence, Tobin‘s q can be utilized to at least identify the 
tendency of cost of equity effects on the transaction size, which we assume to be valid for our 
analyses. Since the comparability of this work to the analysis of Forssbæck and Oxelheim 
(2008, a, b and c) is our underlying aim, the analysis of the equity financing component is 
also based on the mentioned proxies. 
Concerning an interpretation of the proxies P/S and Tobin‘s q, it is worth mentioning 
that they are not used in a conventional way of cost of equity. This would imply that a lower 
value, leading to lower cost of capital, is beneficial. Rather, we argue that the higher the P/S 
ratio and Tobin‘s q, the higher the company is valued and the more funds could be generated 
with a share issue. The same is true for a cross-border M&A with payment in form of a stock 
swap, in an even more pronounced way. Hence, an increase in value of both proxies is 
considered to indicate the strength of equity, resulting in a higher likelihood of cross-border 
M&A and increasing the capability of companies to engage in relatively large transactions.  
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In addition, a development variable was applied (designated as Δ), which shows the 
change in cost of equity. It is defined as the value of the P/S ratio and Tobin‘s q in 2000 and 
2003, respectively, less the average of the previous years‘ ratios. We consider this measure to 
be an indication on how explicit management of the financial factor directly prior to an 
acquisition could affect its likelihood. 
In addition to cost of equity, cost of debt is analyzed, with its proxy being calculated 
by dividing the company‘s actual interest expenditure by its total debt as stated in IS and B/S 
according to Datastream. Although cost of debt is usually calculated using the refinancing 
costs of the current debt, we applied the mentioned accounting-based ratio since our access to 
appropriate data was limited. In the absence of data availability regarding refunding costs, the 
defined measure provides us with a second best proxy. With this we adopt the ratio proposed 
by Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008a), however, it is modified to the extent that we replace 
total liabilities with total debt, because the firm‘s current interest payments are contingent on 
its interest bearing liabilities. Total liabilities, in contrast to total debt, include several line 
items that do not incur interest payments, and hence for us the relation to total debt is more 
specific. However, in principle, the comparability to Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008a) is still 
supposed to be provided, since the adjustment is minor. Once again, a development variable 
which shows the change in cost of debt is applied. Strength of cost of debt is identified as a 
low interest rate, implying a negative correlation between this proxy on the one hand and the 
likelihood of cross-border M&A or its transaction size on the other hand. 
A proxy related to the firm‘s cost of debt is Altman‘s Z‘‘-Score, which is a bankruptcy 
prediction model reacting quickly to changes in certain B/S and IS items so that short-term 
credit ratings can be evaluated (Altmann, 2002). The Z‘‘-Score, which refers to non-
manufacturing firms, is applied since research has shown that FDI is most likely for 
knowledge-intensive firms (e.g. Markusen, 1984), as outlined previously. A high value of the 
Z‘‘-Score is strong in financial terms since it indicates a lower probability of default of the 
respective company. Hence, a firm‘s ability to raise more and/or lower priced debt due to the 
favorable rating is supposed to result in higher likelihood of cross-border M&A and 
transaction size. As mentioned before, the cost of debt measure is not completely adequate, 
leaving out of consideration refinancing costs. However, in the combination with the Z‘‘-
Score as rating proxy, this dimension is covered at least partly. Again, in order to show the 
change of the credit rating, a development variable is applied.  
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As outlined, cost of debt is composed of two aspects, namely interest rate and Z‘‘-
Score. However, the relation of both components is adverse as has been shown by Forssbæck 
and Oxelheim (2008, a and b; 2011). In analogy with their approach, we introduce a further 
variable which captures this interaction. It is calculated by multiplying cost of debt with the 
Z‘‘-Score.  
 
Secondly, funding measures constitute the other important dimension of a firm‘s 
financial strength and comprise internally generated funds and cross-listing. Internal funds are 
proxied by free funds from operations (FFO) less capital expenditure (CAPEX). Companies 
can choose deliberately between distributing the resulting funds (FFO-CAPEX) as dividends 
or plow back the profits in the form of retained earnings which then can subsequently be used 
for M&As or other investments. In the absence of information about the free cash flow, which 
represents the funds available after dividends and share repurchases, and is used by 
Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008, a, b and c, 2011) this measure may be seen as the second 
best solution, since it indicates the level of funds theoretically available for internal financing 
of transactions. Regarding their influence on the likelihood of cross-border M&A activity and 
the relative transaction size, an increase in internal funds is supposed to positively influence 
the dependent variables. 
Connected to the ability of firms to generate internal funds is their capability to 
negotiate more favorable terms of taxation with the government. Underlying consideration is 
that the more a firm can take advantage of subsidies and tax breaks, the more funds will 
ultimately be available in terms of FFO. Therefore, the firm‘s actual tax payment is divided 
by the product of pretax income multiplied by the statutory tax rate, yielding in the deviation 
of actual versus statutory tax expenses. The information for the respective tax rates is taken 
from the tax rate summaries published by PricewaterhouseCoopers (1998, 1999, 2001). As 
regards an interpretation of this proxy, the higher its value, the larger a firm‘s capability to 
take advantage of tax breaks and subsidies, and hence, its influence is supposed to be positive.  
The other dimension of funding is cross-listing shares on more liquid capital markets, 
so that access to competitively priced equity is enabled. Specifically, liquid capital markets 
that are taken into account are the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the NASDAQ, and/or 
the London Stock Exchange (LSE). Thus, a dummy variable is assigned unit value whenever 
companies of the eurozone undertook a cross-listing in these markets during the analysis 
periods. The sources of information used are reports by the three stock exchanges, fact books 
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(NASDAQ, 2011, a and b; NYSE, 2011; LSE, 2011) and Yahoo Finance (2011a) to cross-
check the results. In line with internal funds, cross-listing is supposed to increase the 
likelihood of cross-border M&A and the relative size of transactions.  
5.2.2 Non-financial ownership and control variables 
The other independent variables that are included in the regressions are non-financial 
ownership factors and additional control variables relevant in explaining cross-border M&A. 
With regards to the non-financial ownership characteristics, as suggested by the OLI-
paradigm, firm size and measures of knowledge or capital intensity of the firm are used.  
Firstly, the firm size is proxied with total assets. Although we apply another proxy as 
suggested by Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008, a and b), who used total sales, we consider this 
measures as more appropriate given the changing market environments of our analysis. Sales 
are supposedly sensitive to changes in market environments, to a higher degree than assets. 
We are aware that the amount of total assets may vary among industries not only because of 
mere size but also due to differences in accounting-wise recognition of intangible and tangible 
assets. However, this adjustment of variables is supposed to be of minor impact on the 
explanatory power, so that ultimately, comparability to the results of Forssbæck and 
Oxelheim (2008, a, b and c) is still given. For the second hypothesis, the acquirer size is 
excluded from the independent variables due to the definition of the dependent variable, as 
described below (section 5.3). In accordance with results of literature and research, we expect 
a positive influence of firm size on a firm‘s propensity to undertake FDI. 
Secondly, knowledge and capital intensity of firms, as already elaborated earlier, 
supposedly have an influence on a firm‘s FDI decision. They are proxied by intangible assets 
and net property, plant and equipment (NPPE), respectively, in relation to total assets. As 
regards the second hypothesis, the influence of capital or knowledge intensity on relative deal 
size is not entirely clear, since the amount of FDI undertaken does not shed light on the 
volume of these transactions. However, an industry impact could be apparent, and hence, is 
interesting to test. Therefore, both factors are included.  
Finally, in order to control for other factors that could influence the likelihood of a 
cross-border M&A transaction or its relative size, other independent variables are included in 
the regression. Specifically, they are dummy variables for the home country and the industry 
of the acquirer. Information about the industry of acquirers is retrieved from Credit Risk 
Monitor (2011) to supplement our main source, due to Datastream‘s lack of information.  
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5.3 Definition of dependent variables 
In this section, the two dependent variables, which are introduced to test the stated 
hypotheses, are described. The previously defined independent variables are applied to test for 
both dependent variables in the same manner.  
The first hypothesis, which articulates the increased likelihood of cross-border M&A 
as a consequence of the increased strength of firm-specific financial determinants, is 
measured with a dummy variable. This variable is assigned unit value whenever a company 
undertook at least one cross-border M&A in the years of analysis, i.e. 2000 and 2003, 
respectively, as defined in section 5.1.  
The second hypothesis, articulating the impact of a firm‘s financial condition on 
transaction volume of cross-border M&A, is tested with an additional dependent variable. 
This variable is constructed measuring the respective transaction size of the deals in relation 
to the acquirer‘s size (proxied by its amount of total assets as outlined previously). A relative 
measure instead of an absolute one is applied in order to account for the fact that a transaction 
that is huge for one firm not necessarily needs to be substantial for another firm. The sample 
for the test of the second hypothesis is confined to only those companies undertaking FDI 
which means that the sample size is reduced substantially. In cases where firms undertook 
several cross-border acquisitions in the period of interest, the values of the individual 
transactions are aggregated to one sum. This approach is applied for two reasons: firstly, a 
repeated influence of one firm on the results of the regression is avoided. Secondly, the ability 
of a firm to undertake (large) transactions due to an implementation of a financial strategy is 
assumed to not be expressed by individual transactions, but rather by the sum of all 
transactions undertaken during one year.  
5.4 Sample statistics 
After confining the sample based on the described approach (section 5.1), it encompasses 551 
non-financial firms for the first period (1997 until 2000) and 904 non-financial firms for the 
second period (2000 until 2003). Most firms are located in France and Germany, with a sum 
of 330 companies in the first and 561 companies in the second period. As visible in table 1 
and 2, out of all sample companies 76 undertook cross-border M&As in 2000 and 58 in 2003. 
The number of realized cross-border M&As adds up to 119 and 74, respectively, affirming the 
expectation of reduced cross-border M&A activity in the aftermath of the dot-com bubble. 
The reduction of cross-border M&A activity observed in this sample equals roughly 38 
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percent in terms of the total number of realized deals. Tables 1 and 2 below give an overview 
over the amount of companies and cross-border M&A deals in the respective years of interest. 
 
Table 1: Sample overview 2000 
 
Table 2: Sample overview 2003 
The highest absolute frequency of cross-border M&As was also observed in France 
and Germany, with a sum of 62 and 25 deals in the respective years. However, the number of 
acquiring firms in relation to all firms of these countries in the sample is comparatively low. 
In contrast, 80 percent of firms included in the sample located in the Netherlands undertook 
cross-border M&A deals in 2000. This, however, is partly due to the fact that B/S and IS data 
for a high amount of other Dutch companies was not fully available. Irish firms display a 
strong cross-border M&A activity in both years of analysis, with a proportion of around 60 
percent investing abroad.  
The companies that conducted the most cross-border M&As in 2000 were the Spanish 
firm Telefónica, and the German firms Deutsche Telekom and Fresenius Medical Care with 
four announced deals each. Deutsche Telekom accounts for the largest conjoint transaction 
size in relation to their firm size (35 percent). In 2003, five companies of different countries 
realized each three cross-border M&A deals: the Austrian firm OMV AG, the Spanish 
company Gas Natural SDG S.A., the Irish firms CRH PLC and Kerry Group PLC, and finally 
Sample 
countries
EU excl. 
Sample
Europe excl. 
Sample & EU
US
Americas 
excl. US
Asia + 
Oceania
Africa + 
Middle East
Austria 22 2 3 1 2
Belgium 9 1 1 1
Finland 50 7 11 1 3 1 5 1
France 166 22 36 8 6 2 9 9 2
Germany 164 16 26 3 7 3 9 2 1 1
Ireland 16 6 10 1 5 1 3
Italy 54 7 7 1 3 1 1 1
Netherlands 16 7 13 1 1 1 9 1
Portugal 20 3 3 1 1 1
Spain 34 5 9 2 7
Total 551 76 119 18 26 10 38 22 3 2
Country of 
origin
No of Firms
No of 
acquisition 
firms 
No of 
acquisitions
Target regions
Sample 
countries
EU excl. 
Sample
Europe excl. 
Sample & EU
US
Americas 
excl. US
Asia + 
Oceania
Africa + 
Middle East
Austria 30 2 3 3
Belgium 22 4 4 3 1
Finland 78 7 8 2 3 1 1 1
France 273 9 10 5 1 1 1 1 1
Germany 288 12 15 4 4 3 4
Ireland 20 7 12 9 1 2
Italy 102 9 12 7 1 2 2
Netherlands 19 1 1 1
Portugal 30 0 0
Spain 42 7 9 3 1 1 1 3
Total 904 58 74 34 11 3 13 4 9 0
Country of 
origin
No of Firms
No of 
acquisition 
firms 
No of 
acquisitions
Target regions
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the Italian company Tiscali SPA. Of these deals, OMV undertook the largest conjoint deal 
value in relation to the firm size (9 percent).  
Regarding the host countries, a shift of preferred target region can be observed in the 
two years of analysis. While in 2000, at the peak of the dot-com bubble, the US was clearly 
the favorite destination for cross-border M&As (38 out of 119, or 32 percent), in 2003, only 
13 out of 74 deals were targeted at US firms, while the majority of cross-border M&A deals 
stayed within the eurozone (34 out of 74, or 46 percent).  
Table 3 states the descriptive statistics of both samples for Hypothesis I, including the 
mean of the respective variables, standard deviations and minimum and maximum values.  
 
Table 3: Descriptive statistics 1997-2000 (left) / 2000-2003 (right), Hypothesis I 
Hypothesis II is tested with the same samples, however in reduced form, since only 
those firms are included that undertook cross-border M&A. Austria was the country that 
undertook on average the largest relative deals in 2000, with a mean relative transaction size 
of 1.4, whereas in 2003, this was Italy, with an average relative transaction volume of roughly 
0.5. These countries are also the most pronounced ones in terms of relative transaction size 
when having a look on single companies. The largest individual relative transaction volume 
was invested by the Austrian firm Schlumberger AG, with a conjoint transaction size 
representing almost 2.8 times total assets in 2000. In 2003, the Italian firm Fidia SPA 
undertook transactions with a total value that equaled 3.6 times its size. In total, the average 
relative transaction volume, as visible in table 4 below, fell by roughly 50 percent in the 
respective analysis periods and the absolute transaction size decreased by 40 percent, which 
indicates a very strong recession effect on the transaction size. In absolute terms, the French 
company France Telecom SA realized the largest deal (EUR 54.8 billion) in 2000. In 2003, 
the French company Areva was the firm with the largest cross-border M&A deal with an 
invested amount of over EUR 3 billion. This represents a significant reduction of transaction 
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev Min Max
Acquisition 76
Cross-listing 6
Tobin's q 551 -0,370 0,251 -1,231 0,774
Δ Tobin's q 551 0,009 0,154 -0,786 1,020
Price / Sales 551 -2,763 0,996 -5,709 1,402
Δ Price / Sales 551 -0,191 0,563 -2,838 3,571
Cost of debt 551 0,081 0,057 0,000 0,438
Δ Cost of debt 551 -0,003 0,076 -0,456 0,696
Z''-Score 551 2,263 2,102 -3,279 28,771
Δ Z''-Score 551 -0,183 1,750 -26,896 6,615
Tax reduction 551 0,064 13,401 -305,835 17,651
Internal funds 551 0,021 0,068 -0,534 0,310
Firm size 551 13,000 1,982 8,404 18,514
Knowledge intensity 551 0,089 0,113 -0,022 0,767
Capital intensity 551 0,309 0,253 0,003 4,386
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Acquisition 58
Cross-listing 22
Tobin's q 904 -0,429 0,328 -3,418 0,529
Δ Tobin's q 904 0,019 0,233 -1,293 2,269
Price / Sales 904 -2,857 1,083 -5,993 1,916
Δ Price / Sales 904 -0,090 0,632 -3,307 5,011
Cost of debt 904 0,084 0,079 0,000 0,632
Δ Cost of debt 904 -0,008 0,115 -0,819 1,328
Z''-Score 904 1,679 2,751 -16,998 28,120
Δ Z''-Score 904 -0,458 2,693 -37,477 30,359
Tax reduction 904 0,620 6,301 -157,814 87,211
Internal funds 904 -0,164 4,209 -125,057 1,487
Firm size 904 12,655 2,076 8,540 19,070
Knowledge intensity 904 0,132 0,139 -0,057 0,823
Capital intensity 904 0,267 0,220 0,002 3,763
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value from period 1 to period 2. On the other hand, the total absolute amounts invested in 
cross-border deals in the 10 countries in the years 2000 and 2003 added up to USD 258 billion 
and USD 12 billion dollars, respectively. This is a decrease in total value by roughly 95 
percent. This stands in stark contrast to the findings of Aharon et al. (2010) who found that 
the transaction volume is unaffected by market conditions. However, these figures do only 
represent the changes as regards our analyzed samples and cannot be generalized. 
Table 4 states the descriptive statistics of both samples for Hypothesis II, including the 
mean of the respective variables, standard deviation and minimum and maximum values.  
 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics 1997-2000 (left) / 2000-2003 (right), Hypothesis II  
6. Analysis and results 
In the following, the approach of conducting the regressions is described for each hypothesis. 
A summary of the applied regression runs and tests can be found in the appendix (exhibits 2-
5). In addition, the results are outlined and interpreted.  
6.1 Analysis of Hypothesis I 
6.1.1 Approach 
As outlined in section 3, the described independent variables including firm-specific financial 
variables, non-financial ownership determinants, and control variables are first applied to the 
OLS regression. Each baseline regression and further regressions are conducted both for P/S 
and Tobin‘s q as cost of equity measures in different runs, ceteris paribus, in order to compare 
both measures (in the following, we will refer to the ―P/S regression‖ or the ―Tobin‘s q 
regression‖).  
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Acquisitions 76
Cross-listing 2
Rel. transaction size 76 0,232 0,464 0,000 2,791
Tobin's q 76 -0,303 0,232 -0,836 0,552
Δ Tobin's q 76 0,019 0,163 -0,348 0,502
Price / Sales 76 -2,315 1,030 -5,686 0,381
Δ Price / Sales 76 -0,047 0,424 -1,329 0,834
Cost of debt 76 0,074 0,045 0,009 0,287
Δ Cost of debt 76 -0,011 0,046 -0,206 0,099
Z''-Score 76 2,170 1,732 -0,380 9,733
Δ Z''-Score 76 -0,187 1,334 -6,270 4,472
Tax reduction 76 0,893 0,758 -1,310 4,918
Internal funds 76 0,042 0,052 -0,067 0,275
Knowledge intensity 76 0,140 0,146 0,000 0,767
Capital intensity 76 0,290 0,172 0,032 0,689
Variable Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max
Acquisitions 58
Cross-listing 7
Rel. transaction size 58 0,125 0,479 0,000 3,629
Tobin's q 58 -0,399 0,196 -1,131 -0,011
Δ Tobin's q 58 0,015 0,182 -0,669 0,533
Price / Sales 58 -2,437 0,840 -4,093 -0,306
Δ Price / Sales 58 -0,113 0,465 -1,752 0,864
Cost of debt 58 0,072 0,073 0,029 0,563
Δ Cost of debt 58 -0,005 0,040 -0,072 0,256
Z''-Score 58 2,331 1,842 -1,917 8,199
Δ Z''-Score 58 -0,079 0,922 -2,715 3,507
Tax reduction 58 0,812 0,372 -0,057 1,646
Internal funds 58 0,032 0,079 -0,362 0,239
Knowledge intensity 58 0,135 0,119 0,000 0,518
Capital intensity 58 0,315 0,186 0,016 0,858
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After testing for correlation, multicollinearity, and autocorrelation, specific variables 
are excluded from subsequent analyses in order to make sure the adequacy of the samples for 
the OLS. Given these adjustments, the resulting set of variables, and hence the model, is 
fulfilling all requirements of the OLS to be able to generate valid results except for normal 
distribution of the residuals and homoscedasticity (both null hypotheses are rejected for phase 
1 and 2).  However, the heteroscedasticity is accounted for in applying the White adjustment 
for robust standard errors while running the regression, after which the values display 
homescedasticity. The lack of normal distribution of the residuals is ignored due to two 
circumstances: firstly, the OLS is drawn on only for the purpose of ensuring the adequacy of 
data used in the logit and probit regressions, not as basis for reaching to interpretable results 
(tests for adequacy are not available for logit and probit models). Secondly, and more 
importantly, assuming a larger sample size we expect normal distribution of the residuals, and 
hence we consider the given non-normal distribution not as major problem.  
 
In phase one, comprising the years 1997-2000, the following variables are excluded: 
the dummy variable Portugal, due to autocorrelation, and the interaction variable cost of debt 
x Z‘‘-Score, due to multicollinearity. The results of the Pearson correlation can be seen in 
table 5 below, showing no significant pair-wise correlation between the regressors. Hence, no 
further independent variable is excluded.  
 
Table 5: Pearson correlation matrix; Hypothesis I; 1997-2000 
In phase two, spanning the years 2000-2003, merely the dummy variables Portugal 
and Netherlands are excluded. Again, the Pearson correlation matrix does not show any sign 
of correlation between the regressors so that no additional variables are excluded (table 6).  
Cross-
listing
P/S ΔP/S
Tobin's 
q
Δ 
Tobin's 
q
Cost of 
debt
Δ Cost 
of debt
Z''-Score
Δ Z''-
Score
Debt x Z''-
Score
Internal 
funds
Tax
Total 
assets
Intangi-
bles
NPPE
Cross-listing 1,00
P/S 0,13 1,00
Δ P/S 0,04 0,23 1,00
Tobin's q 0,08 0,06 0,01 1,00
Δ Tobin's q 0,00 0,02 0,05 -0,01 1,00
Cost of debt -0,01 0,00 0,04 0,02 0,05 1,00
Δ Cost of debt -0,04 -0,02 -0,02 0,11 -0,09 -0,01 1,00
Z''-Score 0,05 0,32 0,07 -0,11 -0,12 0,21 -0,05 1,00
Δ Z''-Score -0,06 -0,03 0,29 -0,15 -0,30 0,05 0,05 0,05 1,00
Debt x Z''-Score 0,00 0,23 0,08 -0,02 -0,04 0,69 -0,02 0,74 0,04 1,00
Internal Funds 0,00 0,24 0,07 -0,09 -0,21 0,16 0,00 0,45 0,25 0,35 1,00
Tax 0,01 0,06 0,01 0,03 0,00 -0,04 0,00 0,04 -0,01 0,01 0,01 1,00
Total assets 0,13 0,06 0,03 0,14 -0,01 -0,06 -0,02 -0,18 0,05 -0,09 0,02 0,01 1,00
Intangibles 0,06 0,26 0,07 0,20 -0,07 -0,15 0,00 -0,08 -0,01 -0,07 0,07 0,00 0,16 1,00
NPPE 0,02 0,19 -0,03 0,02 0,00 -0,04 0,06 0,18 0,02 0,18 -0,17 0,06 0,09 -0,11 1,00
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Table 6: Pearson correlation matrix; Hypothesis I; 2000-2003 
After the regression with the OLS, a step-wise elimination of non-significant variables 
is carried through, so that only those variables remain that are significant at least at the 90 
percent confidence interval. This procedure is applied in order to obtain a specification with 
reduced number of regressors. The Wald-Test is conducted in order to test for the joint 
significance of the remaining financial variables. These variables are subsequently used for 
the logit and probit models since the OLS does not generate reliable results due to the nature 
of the dependent variable, as described before.  
6.1.2 Regression results phase 1 
The results of the OLS regression and logit and probit regressions cannot be compared 
directly owing to the fact that the dependent variable expresses qualitative rather than 
quantitative information. However, it is obvious that at least regarding coefficient sign they 
coincide. The significance of specific variables seems to be diminished in the logit and probit 
models in comparison to the OLS model, but the variables per se are widely the same (exhibit 
2).  
 The results of the regressions regarding the financial determinants confirm the 
assumption that specific components are influencing the likelihood of cross-border M&A. In 
particular the determinant that represents the equity dimension – the P/S ratio – is statistically 
significant. As expected, it is positively correlated with the likelihood to undertake cross-
border M&A. As regards the economic significance, the resulting coefficients of logit and 
probit regressions cannot be interpreted easily because the relation between dependent 
variable and independent variables is not linear. However, using the rule of thumb suggested 
by Wooldridge (2000, in: Forssbæck and Oxelheim, 2008c), the coefficients of the probit 
regression are divided by 2,5 and the resulting value can be interpreted in terms of economic 
Cross-
listing
P/S ΔP/S
Tobin's 
q
Δ 
Tobin's 
q
Cost of 
debt
Δ Cost 
of debt
Z''-Score
Δ Z''-
Score
Debt x Z''-
Score
Internal 
funds
Tax
Total 
assets
Intangi-
bles
NPPE
Cross Listing 1,00
P/S -0,01 1,00
Δ P/S 0,02 -0,14 1,00
Tobin's q 0,02 -0,25 -0,04 1,00
Δ Tobin's q -0,03 -0,09 0,22 0,03 1,00
Cost of Debt -0,03 0,09 -0,09 -0,07 -0,01 1,00
Δ Cost of Debt 0,00 -0,05 -0,02 0,06 -0,04 -0,12 1,00
Z-Score 0,02 0,20 0,05 -0,28 -0,35 -0,01 0,01 1,00
ΔZ-Score 0,04 -0,06 0,25 0,07 -0,22 -0,05 0,14 0,24 1,00
Debt x Z-Score 0,00 0,09 -0,02 -0,16 -0,29 0,29 0,07 0,71 0,07 1,00
Free Funds 0,01 -0,06 -0,03 0,06 -0,15 0,01 0,02 -0,02 0,07 0,00 1,00
Tax 0,03 -0,01 -0,01 0,06 -0,04 -0,07 0,06 0,07 0,04 0,06 0,01 1,00
Total Assets 0,16 -0,05 0,02 0,26 -0,11 -0,16 0,00 -0,03 0,14 0,01 0,07 0,04 1,00
Intangibles 0,05 0,22 -0,14 0,08 0,12 -0,02 0,04 -0,31 -0,13 -0,19 0,02 -0,05 0,11 1,00
NPPE 0,03 0,00 0,11 0,10 -0,01 -0,10 0,01 0,10 0,13 0,17 0,03 0,06 0,18 -0,28 1,00
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significance. Applying this technique, the P/S values do not display strong economic 
significance: a marginal increase of P/S – indicating a reduced cost of equity as outlined in 
section 5.2 – raises the likelihood of cross-border acquisitions by roughly 7 percent. The 
equity-related development variable, Δ P/S, which represents the change of P/S from the years 
1997-1999 to 2000, is also positively correlated and statistically significant. However, the 
economic significance of Δ P/S is stronger than in the case of P/S, although the increase of the 
likelihood by roughly 10 percent per marginal increase in Δ P/S is still not very high. Tobin‘s 
q, on the contrary, though weakly positively correlated with the dependent variable, 
completely lacks explanatory power. Both regression runs, the P/S regression and the Tobin‘s 
q regression, reveal insignificance of all components of related to cost of debt, i.e. cost of 
debt, Δ cost of debt, and Z‘‘-Score as proxy for the firm‘s credit rating. The Z‘‘-Score under 
the P/S regression is slightly negative which contradicts our expectation of a positive 
influence. However, it is not significant and thus, this result is not meaningful. Internal funds, 
proxied by FFO less CAPEX, display a strong significance in the OLS and are still relevant in 
the logit and probit models, though weaker in the P/S regression. Under the Tobin‘s q 
regression, the statistical significance of internal funds even increases in logit and probit 
compared to OLS. Also the economic significance is very pronounced in both cases. Although 
the tax-related variable is highly significant in the OLS model under the Tobin‘s q regression, 
its coefficient equals zero and thus the influence on the likelihood of firms‘ decision to invest 
abroad is negligible. Hence, both regression runs (P/S and Tobins‘q) are in accordance that 
taxes cannot be seen as determining the likelihood of cross-border M&A activity. In the same 
line, the cross-listing variable does not impact the likelihood of acquisitions.  
The most significant determining variable in all models and both under P/S and 
Tobin‘s q regressions, is firm size, confirming the results of most literature on this topic. This 
very robust result is highly significant in statistical and economic sense. A marginal increase 
of the firm size results in a 15-16 percent higher likelihood of FDI in both regression runs. 
Regarding other non-financial ownership determinants, the results of P/S and Tobin‘s q 
regressions differ. While the former does neither enable a definite statement regarding 
knowledge intensity nor capital intensity, the latter supports somewhat the assumption that 
knowledge-intensive firms are more likely to undertake FDI due to a positive correlation and 
statistical significance.  
Concerning the control variables, only a few of them display significance: Ireland and 
the Netherlands exhibit a strong explanatory power in both regression runs. This is probably 
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due to the high proportion of acquiring firms relative to the whole number of sample-firms of 
these countries as stated earlier. The results of the industry dummies cannot be interpreted 
clearly under the P/S regression. Under the Tobin‘s q regression, however, technology and 
utilities are the only industries that are significant in a robust way. Technology is positively 
correlated, whereas utilities are negatively correlated with the likelihood of FDI, and 
significance is pronounced in logit and probit, confirming the assumption that knowledge-
intensive companies are more likely to invest abroad than capital-intensive firms.  
 
In general, the Tobin‘s q and P/S regressions generate slightly different results. 
Specifically, in the former one, the amount of remaining variables after the step-wise 
elimination is very reduced, in particular regarding the financial variables (only Δ cost of debt 
and internal funds). In addition, the cost of equity dimension seems to play only an important 
role in the latter case. The partly differing results raise the question about robustness and 
hence, whether or not a reliable interpretation of the results is possible. However, both logit 
and probit appear to be adequate models, according to the Mc Fadden R² Test and the 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Test. OLS as model is not adequate taking into account the values of R² 
and the RESET Test. This is in line with our expectations. 
6.1.3 Regression results phase 2 
The results of the regressions in phase 2 are shown in the appendix (exhibit 3), As regards the 
equity proxies under the P/S regressions, P/S itself is statistically significant, irrespective of 
the regression model used. Logit results underline an increase in the odds of cross-border 
M&A likelihood with an improvement of the cost of equity proxy, which is statistically 
highly significant. Using the rule of thumb for the probit model, this impression is supportef 
by the P/S showing an influence of around 9 percent on the likelihood of making a cross-
border acquisition. When exchanging P/S for Tobin‘s q as a measure of cost of equity, ceteris 
paribus, we do not find importance of this equity measure itself. However, Δ Tobin‘s q is 
slightly statistically significant, with a positive influence on the cross-border M&A decision. 
This effect is found in all models. With regards to economic significance, Δ Tobin‘s q 
increases the likelihood of cross-border M&As by 22 percent. This highlights that the higher a 
change in Tobin‘s q prior to an acquisition, the higher the acquisition likelihood. All other 
financial variables, intending to explain an effect of cost of debt (cost of debt, Δ cost of debt, 
Z‘‘-Score, Δ Z‘‘-Score) or an internal financing effect (internal funds, tax reduction) on cross-
border M&A likelihood, are insignificant and seldom have a coefficient other than zero under 
  
 
34 Analysis and results 
the P/S regressions. Only under the Tobin‘s q regression a positive rating effect, as expected, 
becomes significant. When testing for economic validity, we find only marginal evidence for 
the rating effect, proxied by the Z‘‘-Score. It increases the likelihood of undertaking cross-
border acquisitions by only 4 percent. Hence, the results do not explicitly support a cost of 
debt or an internal financing effect as determinants for FDI. Referring to cross-listing and its 
impact on the likelihood of undertaking cross-border M&As no significance can be found. 
As regards the non-financial regressors, we again find firm size to be strongly 
significant in explaining the likelihood of undertaking FDI, irrespective of the regressions and 
the cost of equity proxy used. Application of the approximation for the probit coefficients 
leads to an increase in acquisition likelihood by 12 percent based on firm size. Knowledge 
intensity is slightly significant under the P/S regression after step-wise elimination of 
insignificant variables, but with a negative coefficient indicating a negative relationship 
between the cross-border M&A decision and high knowledge intensity. This stands in contrast 
to prior expectations and the outcome that industry dummies for technological firms and 
healthcare have positive signs. However, only healthcare has a significant influence on the 
dependent variable.  
Taking into consideration tests of goodness of fit of the regression model and 
explanatory power of the regressors, we find that the OLS, as expected and explained earlier, 
is not adequate to evaluate our hypothesis. Tests regarding logit and probit, in contrast, show 
satisfying results and, hence, some explanatory power for the tested hypothesis. Furthermore, 
the Wald-Test indicates explanatory strength of the included financial variables, especially in 
the logit and probit regressions. Hence, we surmise that the identified significant financial 
determinants are relevant factors in the acquisition decision of firms.  
6.1.4 Effect of financial market conditions: Comparison 
As regards the analysis of Hypothesis I, which claims that firm-specific financial factors 
increase the likelihood of cross-border M&A, the results clearly indicate an equity effect 
measured by P/S, irrespective of the financial market condition. Furthermore, in neither of the 
periods, debt related measures, taxation and cross-listing have explanatory power. Thus, these 
results do not support the assumption that impact of determinants varies with financial market 
circumstances. However, different results are identified regarding internal funds, where 
influence on cross-border acquisition likelihood is highly significant in period 1, but 
absolutely insignificant in period 2. This can probably be owing to the economic distress in 
the aftermath of the bubble‘s burst, where internal funds might be used for other needs rather 
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than for cross-border M&As due to limited access to capital in general. The significance of Δ 
Tobin‘s q in period 2 in contrast to period 1, however, is difficult to directly attribute to 
market circumstances, because the character of change is not observable. 
 With regard to non-financial ownership factors, firm size can be identified as being 
stable in changing market environments and displays high significance in all specifications. 
Information about firm characteristics other than size is ambiguous comparing both periods, 
hence indicating an impact of financial market conditions.  
 
Comparing the findings to the benchmark analysis of Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008, 
a, b and c), we find similar effects of P/S and firm size. What is more, neither of the studies 
can identify an explicit cost of debt effect. However, the highly informative value of cross-
listing found by Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008, a, b and c) cannot be supported by this 
study. Moreover, whereas this paper finds strong significance of an internal financing effect 
on the cross-border M&A decision and thereby supports the expectations of both studies, 
Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008, a, b and c) themselves did not find evidence for this effect. 
This might be due to different definitions of internal funds.  
The somewhat different results are surprising, since the same period has been 
analyzed. However, both studies differ significantly in sample size and constellation, which 
might be an important factor influencing the final outcome.   
To conclude, we find our first hypothesis, that the strength of single firm-specific 
financial factors increases the likelihood of firm‘s to undertake cross-border M&A, to be 
confirmed. Altered financial market conditions indeed impact which factors are determining 
this propensity. 
6.2 Analysis of Hypothesis II 
6.2.1 Approach  
The approach applied for Hypothesis II is widely similar to the one utilized in conducting  
Hypothesis II. However, the most important difference is that the OLS, hence the linear 
regression model (4), is the specification that is used as a basis for interpretation. Logit and 
probit specifications are not applicable in this context. Again, we run different regressions 
with P/S and Tobin‘s q, respectively. 
After testing for correlation, multicollinearity, and autocorrelation, specific variables 
are excluded from subsequent analyses in order to make sure the adequacy of the samples for 
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the OLS. Given these adjustments, the resulting set of variables, and hence the model, is 
fulfilling all requirements of the OLS to be able to generate valid results, except for 
homoscedasticity of the residuals. However, this lack can be overcome applying the White 
adjustment for robust standard errors while running the regression, after which the values 
display homescedasticity. In contrast to the first specification, normal distribution is achieved 
in these regression runs by adding dummy variables that counterbalance outliers. Thus, the 
results from the OLS regression can be interpreted appropriately.  
 
In phase one the following variables are excluded: the dummy variable Portugal due to 
multicollinearity, and the industry dummy transportation due to the fact that no firms in this 
period were operating in this industry.  
The results of Pearson correlation can be seen in table 7 below, showing a rather high 
correlation between the cost of debt variable and the interaction variable cost of debt x Z‘‘-
Score. Hence, the latter is excluded as well.   
 
Table 7: Pearson correlation matrix; Hypothesis II; 1997-2000 
In phase two the dummy variable Portugal and the industry variable conglomerates are 
excluded due to multicollinearity, and the Netherlands due to the fact that in this period no 
acquiring companies are operating in this country.  
The Pearson correlation matrix reveals a rather high correlation between the variables 
cost of debt, cost of debt x Z‘‘-Score, and Δ cost of debt, and hence cost of debt and the 
interaction variable are further excluded.   
Cross-
listing
P/S ΔP/S
Tobin's 
q
Δ 
Tobin's 
q
Cost of 
debt
Δ Cost 
of debt
Z''-Score
Δ Z''-
Score
Debt x Z''-
Score
Internal 
funds
Tax
Intangi-
bles
NPPE
Cross-listing 1,00
P/S 0,06 1,00
Δ P/S 0,01 0,21 1,00
Tobin's q -0,02 0,37 0,24 1,00
Δ Tobin's q 0,05 0,10 -0,11 0,08 1,00
Cost of debt 0,08 -0,18 -0,04 0,02 0,17 1,00
Δ Cost of debt -0,17 0,09 0,03 0,05 -0,35 -0,67 1,00
Z''-Score -0,01 0,26 0,22 0,32 0,25 0,29 -0,14 1,00
Δ Z''-Score -0,23 -0,09 0,23 -0,05 -0,03 0,04 0,06 0,34 1,00
Debt x Z''-Score 0,04 0,11 0,20 0,22 0,28 0,76 -0,47 0,73 0,21 1,00
Internal Funds -0,08 0,45 0,05 0,41 0,06 0,05 0,08 0,43 -0,25 0,31 1,00
Tax -0,01 0,09 -0,10 -0,02 0,04 0,03 0,07 0,12 0,08 0,07 0,10 1,00
Intangibles -0,07 0,37 0,00 0,07 -0,15 -0,23 0,16 -0,30 -0,09 -0,28 0,01 0,00 1,00
NPPE 0,19 0,00 -0,28 -0,34 0,09 0,02 -0,09 -0,26 0,08 -0,15 -0,22 0,07 -0,35 1,00
highlighted cell indicates correlation: Debt x Z-Score is excluded in subsequent regression
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Table 8: Pearson correlation matrix; Hypothesis II; 2000-2003 
As mentioned before, the traditional FDI determinants are reduced by the proxy for 
firm size, i.e. total assets owing to the definition of the dependent variable. After the first 
regression with the OLS, a step-wise elimination of non-significant variables is carried 
through, so that only those variables remain that were significant at least at the 90 percent 
confidence interval. The Wald-Test is conducted in order to test for the joint significance of 
the remaining financial variables. This procedure is applied in order to get a specification with 
reduced number of regressors. The resulting findings are interpreted before conducting 
several robustness tests in form of running the (4) regression specification, firstly, without all 
control variables, i.e. all home country and industry dummy variables, and secondly, 
including the control variables but excluding the traditional FDI determinants.  
6.2.2  Regression results phase 1 
After applying the described procedure, the following results were retrieved from the 
regressions (exhibit 4). The cost of equity proxy P/S in the first run shows a rather strong 
statistical significance with positive coefficient, as expected. The value of the coefficient 
indicates an increase of the transaction size by 8 percent per marginal increase of the P/S ratio 
after the step-wise elimination of non-significant variables. When testing for robustness, the 
proxy loses all explanatory power and even turns negative. An exchange of the cost of equity 
proxy shows that Tobin‘s q is significant both in statistical and economic sense. This result is 
also robust to changes in the specification. The sign of the coefficient is positive, indicating a 
positive influence of Tobin‘s q on the transaction size, as expected. After eliminating non-
significant regressors, a marginal increase of the Tobin‘s q leads to an increase of the 
transaction size by 30 percent. However, when interpreting this result, the limitation that 
Cross-
listing
P/S ΔP/S
Tobin's 
q
Δ 
Tobin's 
q
Cost of 
debt
Δ Cost 
of debt
Z''-Score
Δ Z''-
Score
Debt x Z''-
Score
Internal 
funds
Tax
Intangi-
bles
NPPE
Cross-listing 1,00
P/S -0,14 1,00
Δ P/S 0,03 -0,13 1,00
Tobin's q 0,15 0,02 -0,08 1,00
Δ Tobin's q -0,07 -0,13 0,18 -0,44 1,00
Cost of debt -0,02 0,06 -0,11 0,01 -0,33 1,00
Δ Cost of debt -0,13 0,20 -0,11 -0,01 -0,29 0,76 1,00
Z''-Score -0,12 0,29 0,11 -0,18 -0,33 0,39 0,27 1,00
Δ Z''-Score 0,07 0,14 0,34 0,33 -0,16 -0,07 -0,03 -0,08 1,00
Debt x Z''-Score -0,06 0,18 -0,10 0,00 -0,40 0,93 0,82 0,57 -0,11 1,00
Internal Funds 0,00 0,06 0,23 -0,03 -0,33 0,25 0,08 0,54 0,11 0,34 1,00
Tax 0,19 0,20 0,09 -0,11 -0,09 -0,01 -0,11 0,25 -0,12 0,03 0,23 1,00
Intangibles 0,19 0,25 0,01 0,32 -0,08 -0,15 -0,09 -0,35 0,23 -0,17 -0,01 0,18 1,00
NPPE -0,02 -0,14 -0,11 -0,24 0,21 -0,20 -0,12 -0,40 -0,01 -0,25 -0,41 -0,03 -0,37 1,00
highlighted cell indicates correlation: Debt x Z-Score and Cost of Debt is excluded in subsequent regression
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Tobin‘s q is not an entirely adequate proxy for cost of equity, since it is rather a valuation 
measure, needs to be observed, as discussed earlier (section 4.2). As a consequence, an 
economic significance of 30 percent of Tobin‘s q cannot be translated directly into an equally 
strong cost of equity effect, but can be taken as an indication of significance. Since both P/S 
and Tobin‘s q measures are significant, we conclude that the equity dimension in fact is a 
determining factor.  
The cost of debt component of the cost of capital appears to be a determining factor in 
both regression runs. The sign of the coefficient is negative, as expected, in all runs, and at 
least initially with highly statistical significance. The value of the negative coefficient is very 
high (1,04), indicating also a strong economic significance. Under the Tobin‘s q regression, 
the baseline regression shows no significance of cost of debt. Only after the step-wise 
elimination of non-significant variables, a negative correlation with very high significance is 
observed. The results regarding the firm‘s credit rating (proxied by the Z‘‘-Score) are similar 
in both regression runs; the regression after step-wise elimination leads to a rather significant 
result. Interestingly, the score seems to be negatively correlated with the relative transaction 
size. Since the value of the coefficient is not very high, however, the economic significance 
can be denied.  
Internal funds for financing cross-border deals seem to play an important role in both 
regression runs. The expected positive coefficient displays both strong statistical and 
economic significance although no explanatory value whatsoever when testing for robustness. 
Tax effects are not observed at all. Finally, the cross-listing dummy, although it is statistically 
highly significant if all variables are included and after step-wise elimination of insignificant 
determinants, loses its significance when testing for robustness. Still, its economic 
significance is rather high (around 15 percent). 
 Regarding the non-financial ownership determinants its worth mentioning that the 
proxy for knowledge intensity displays high statistical significance, irrespective of the 
regression specification. Interestingly, the sign of the coefficient is negative. A reason could 
be that knowledge-intensive companies indeed invest abroad more frequently, however, with 
smaller investments. Under the P/S regression, capital intensity seems to be determining the 
transaction size, too, whereas the proxy – NPPE as portion of total assets – is not significant at 
all under the Tobin‘s q regressions. The negative sign of the coefficient is given in both case, 
implying that also capital intensity does not impact the relative transaction size either. .  
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 With reference to the industry dummies, in particular utilities seem to be negatively 
determining the size of cross-border M&A deals. This supports the finding of negatively 
correlated capital intensity.  
 Of the source country dummies only Austria is consistently significant in both 
regression runs. In the P/S regression, also the Netherlands are significant. Both countries 
determine the transaction size positively.  
 In general, one can conclude that independent from the proxy for cost of equity, the 
results are widely the same. All firm-specific financial factors, except for tax, seem to be 
explanatory for the size of a cross-border transaction. According to the R² value, the goodness 
of fit of the specifications seems to be highly adequate, however, the rejection of the RESET 
hypothesis indicates that explanatory variables are omitted, thus a better model specification 
could be found. 
6.2.3 Regression results phase 2 
The results of the regressions for phase 2 are shown in the appendix (exhibit 5). The most 
relevant equity-related financial determinant under the P/S regression is Δ P/S. Its influence 
is slightly positive and highly significant in explaining an increase in the relative transaction 
size, indicating that the stronger the change in cost of equity, the higher the relative cross-
border M&A volume. Even in the robustness tests this effect is visible. However, we cannot 
infer if the correlation is based on an increase or a decrease in cost of equity. An analogous 
result is apparent when substituting P/S by Tobin‘s q as cost of equity proxy, keeping all else 
equal. Here, also Δ Tobin‘s q significantly explains an increase in transaction volume. Thus, 
an equity effect cannot be identified for the tested hypothesis in phase 2 without ambiguity. 
With regard to the cost of debt measures, a negative influence of the change in the firm‘s 
credit rating (Δ Z‘‘-Score) can be found. It is highly significant in explaining the relative 
transaction size in the baseline regression, after step-wise elimination, as well as in the 
regression excluding non-financial variables. This outcome is visible under both, the P/S and 
the Tobin‘s q regressions. However, once country and industry dummies are excluded, no 
statistical significance for the rating‘s change is observable anymore. On the contrary, with 
this specification, the rating itself displays a highly significant positive impact on the relative 
acquisition size. Under the Tobin‘s q regressions, even the baseline regression and OLS after 
step-wise elimination show this positive influence of the Z‘‘-Score. However, while the rating 
variable (Z‘‘-Score) has unambiguously positive influence on the outcome, the change 
variable (Δ Z‘‘-Score) could indicate that either an enhancement or an impairment of the 
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rating is responsible for an increase of the transaction volume. Consequently, drawing a 
reliable conclusion regarding the impact of the rating on the transaction size is complicated. 
As regards cost of debt, change in cost of debt, and the tax reduction, results are highly 
insignificant. Once again, no clear cost of debt effect can be found.  Internal financing as a 
determinant for deal size is only slightly statistically significant after step-wise elimination 
under the P/S regression. Its negative sign stands in contrast to prior expectations. However, 
the impact of the internal financing effect seems to be rather insignificant. Hence, we cannot 
infer a clear influence of any of the financial factors on the relative transaction size of cross-
border M&As. However, the influence of the change variables is definitely higher than that of 
the basic regressors, but unfortunately not easily interpretable. Referring to cross-listing, no 
meaningful influence can be found on the transaction volume of cross-border M&A, since 
coefficient, sign, and significance level vary widely depending on the regression constellation.  
As regards the non-financial ownership determinants, knowledge intensity of a firm 
seems to be positively influencing the transaction size with high economic significance. 
However, industry dummies do not necessarily support the impact of knowledge intensity.  
Interestingly, general results are varying somewhat widely depending on the 
regression constellation (P/S or Tobin‘s q). Moreover, under the P/S regression, the 
robustness scenario OLS without control variables strongly changes the composition of 
explaining financial factors compared to all other three scenarios. This leads to the 
impression, that the used variables are not encompassing all necessary influence factors, as is 
also outlined by the RESET Test results. Thus, although the used OLS model seems to be 
adequate according to R², important variables are omitted, leading to the necessity of further 
research to account for more or other specifications. Nevertheless, as is indicated by the 
Wald-Test, the included financial regressors have a very strong explanatory power, and, thus, 
are important determinants of relative transaction size.  
6.2.4 Effect of financial market conditions: Comparison 
As regards the analysis of Hypothesis II, which claims that the strength of firm-specific 
financial factors increases the relative transaction size of cross-border M&A, the results do 
clearly indicate that firm-specific financial factors are relevant for the relative transaction size. 
However, altering financial market circumstances influence which financial determinants 
impact the relative transaction size and hence their explanatory power.  
In phase 1, the cost of equity effect is underlined by both P/S and Tobin‘s q, 
respectively, while in phase 2 only Δ Tobin‘s q has strong explanatory value. Referring to 
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cost of debt, no conclusion can be drawn, since the variable is excluded from the second 
period‘s analysis due to multicollinearity. However, the credit rating influence is definitely 
lower in the second period. Hence, no general cost of debt effect is given in phase 2 so that, 
once again, no congruence between the periods can be identified. This statement is also valid 
for the internal financing, which seems to be a highly explanatory factor in phase 1. 
 Whereas in phase 1 almost all financial variables seem to have influence on the 
relative transaction size, the results of phase 2 neither support the findings of phase 1, nor do 
they suggest unambiguously interpretable results. However, the Wald-Test indicates a joint 
significance of the firm-specific financial factors. 
To conclude, we find our second hypothesis, that the strength of single firm-specific 
financial factors increases the relative transaction size of cross-border M&A, to be confirmed. 
Altered financial market conditions strongly impact which factors are determining the size. 
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7. Concluding remarks 
7.1 Summary and conclusion 
The aim of the paper was to empirically test two hypotheses. The first hypothesis addresses 
the assumption that the strength of firm-specific financial determinants increases the 
likelihood of cross-border M&A. The second hypothesis reasons that this strength also 
influences the relative size of cross-border M&A. Firm-specific financial factors include the 
firm‘s cost of capital (cost of equity and cost of debt, including the rating), and its access to 
internal and external funding. These can be influenced by a firm‘s financial strategy, which 
comprises special means such as cross-listing in more liquid capital markets, and the 
exploitation / negotiation of tax breaks. The strength of financial factors in this context is 
equivalent to their positive influence on the capability of the firm to undertake acquisitions or 
to undertake relatively large deals, respectively. Both hypotheses were each examined in very 
different financial market conditions in order to assess the influence of market environments. 
We expected to find a positive impact of these financial factors on FDI likelihood and 
transaction size in general irrespective of the macro environment, whereas the specific factors 
that are significant, respectively, were supposed to differ. 
With the help of binary-response regressions, Hypothesis I was tested with non-
financial companies of 10 countries within the eurozone in 2000 and 2003. Information about 
B/S and IS data during the 48 months prior to the acquisition years formed the basis for the 
analyzed variables. The influence of the firm-specific financial factors on FDI likelihood was 
tested along with other, non-financial FDI determinants, as proposed by the OLI-paradigm, 
for instance. These factors included firm size, knowledge intensity and capital intensity, and 
control variables such as country and industry of the acquirer.  
 Our results partially confirm the findings of Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008, a, b and 
c), whose study has been used as the basis for our analysis. We found strong evidence that 
financial determinants are crucial for the propensity of companies to engage in cross-border 
M&A. In particular we identified a pronounced effect of those factors related to equity 
financing in all regression runs. However, in contrast to Forssbæck and Oxelheim (2008, a, b 
and c), we did not find support for their finding of relevance of cross-listing shares on a more 
liquid equity market. On the other hand, the regression results suggest a high importance of 
internally generated funds. The equity effect is robust to changes in the macro environment, 
whereas internal funds are influenced by altered market conditions regarding their explanatory 
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power of FDI likelihood. This may be due to economic distress in the aftermath of the bubble 
in 2003, where internal funds are used for other needs due to limited access to capital in 
general rather than for cross-border M&As. In accordance with Forssbæck and Oxelheim‘s 
(2008, a and b) findings, no cost of debt effect could be identified in neither of the 
specifications.  
 Based on OLS regressions, Hypothesis II was tested including only the acquisition 
firms of the sample used for testing the first hypothesis. The independent variables used to 
test their influence on the dependent variable were the same as in the previous regression. The 
results were tested for robustness in conducting further regressions with differing 
combinations of independent variables.  
 The results regarding Hypothesis II clearly indicate that firm-specific financial factors 
are relevant for the relative transaction size. However, altering financial market circumstances 
influence which financial determinants impact the relative transaction size and hence their 
explanatory power. All firm-specific financial factors have explanatory power for the relative 
transaction size in a favorable market environment, whereas no unambiguously interpretable 
results are delivered under tense market conditions. Some impact of the conjoint financial 
factors on relative transaction volume in the latter case can still be acknowledged, according 
to additional tests we conducted.  
 To sum up, the strength of firm-specific financial factors indeed impacts the firm‘s 
decision to undertake FDI and the size of transactions. Hence, both formulated hypotheses are 
affirmed, at least partially. The most crucial financial determinant seems to be the equity 
dimension, both in terms of FDI likelihood and the size of transactions. Interestingly, internal 
funds appear to be highly affected by macro circumstances when it comes to FDI likelihood, 
however, the transaction size remains without influence. Hence, we cannot conclude that both 
hypotheses are coherent as regards the single firm-specific financial factors identified as being 
significant in explaining the transaction decision and relative transaction size, respectively. 
This said, the strength of firm-specific financial factors does not influence the relative 
transaction size to the same extent as it does the likelihood of undertaking cross-border M&A.  
 
These findings help to understand firm‘s strategic decisions prior to cross-border 
M&A, also against the background of changing market environments. Moreover, they 
underline the fact that a firm equipped with strong financials will be able to undertake 
relatively larger transactions. Forssbæck and Oxelheim‘s (2008, a, b and c) claim that the 
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importance of financial determinants is highly underestimated and the authors‘ suggestion to 
acknowledge those determinants‘ independent explanatory power is strongly supported by our 
findings. This is also valid in other contexts of FDI, such as the transaction size. Another 
important implication of our findings is that this conclusion is not only true in specific market 
circumstances or environments, but can rather be applied more generally.  
7.2 Suggestions for further research 
Some limitations concerning the validity of our findings must be acknowledged, however, 
their discussion can form a fruitful base for further research.  
Certain adjustments to the basic sample were made that can have caused selection bias 
which supposedly influenced the capability of outcomes to be general in their interpretation. 
Although data was extracted to the best extent possible, eliminations of firms from the sample 
due to a lack of data availability were unavoidable. Moreover, the results of Hypothesis I are 
influenced by our choice to exclude cross-border M&As without information about deal size, 
not only for the second but also for the first hypothesis (where the deal size per se is not of 
interest). However, our reason for adopting this approach was the aim to achieve 
comparability of the results of both hypotheses regarding the determining variables. Another 
important sample-specification we made was to include only cross-border M&As that 
exceeded the threshold of a 50 percent acquisition, which might have influenced the results 
strongly, since the importance of strong financials is not necessarily bound to the acquired 
stake. However, considering our reasoning for the sample modifications, we accepted the 
limitations.  
General model specifications such as the approach used to test Hypothesis I 
(eliminating insignificant variables using the OLS before conducting the logit and probit 
regressions) can be questioned. This is also valid for the particular specifications of the 
models and the robustness tests applied. However, results are still meaningful, but can be 
considered even more stable after confirmation based on other model specifications. 
Furthermore, the choice and specification of variables has an enormous influence on 
the final outcome. In particular, the financial variables have some limitations with regards to 
their ability to adequately proxy cost of capital components. This issue has already been 
discussed extensively in section 5 (data set and variable definitions). However, in particular 
an analysis aimed at introducing better cost of equity measures (such as a particular 
approximation or direct use of the capital asset pricing model to also account for the risk 
dimension) would be an interesting area for further research. Especially, since the proxies 
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used in our and Forssbæck and Oxelheim‘s (2008, a, b and c) study indicate a clear cost of 
equity effect on the FDI decision of a firm.  
Besides these limitations, our results offer explicit information regarding firm-specific 
financial factors and a firm‘s decision to undertake FDI and the respective transaction 
volumes. However, there are still many other areas to investigate on. Firstly, additional 
supposedly explanatory factors could be integrated in further investigations, such as a firm‘s 
leverage, measured by the debt-to-equity ratio, or the firm‘s acquisition history, which can 
have significant impact on the financial strength. In the same line, the method of payment 
used in cross-border M&A could be an interesting factor to analyze in the course of a firm‘s 
capability to engage in large deals, because the need for financial strength per se should be 
more strongly pronounced in cash deals, whereas cross-listing could be more relevant in stock 
swaps. Referring to the cross-listing, our results suggest interesting implications for further 
research to the extent that the specification of liquid financial markets could be broadened and 
adjusted to more recent developments. Germany, for instance, could be interpreted as liquid 
financial market, since many of the analyzed firms cross-listed their shares on a German stock 
exchange. In general, a study combining our approach (focus on ownership-specific 
advantages) with effects of other important FDI determinants such as economic environment 
of home and target country, and political and regulatory issues (location aspects), as has 
already been applied by Forssbaeck and Oxelheim (2011), but regarding the transaction 
volume, would constitute a comprehensive examination and hence, could offer valuable 
interpretation of our findings. 
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Appendix 
Exhibit 1: Variable description 
 
Variable Description
expected 
sign H1
expected 
sign H2
Dependent variable 1 Acquisition Dummy variable; equals 1 if foreign acquisition was 
undertaken in 2000 or 2003, respectively, 0 otherwise
Dependent variable 2 Relative transaction size relative transaction volume (sum of all transaction volumes of 
2000 and 2003, respectively) expressed as transaction size  
/ acquirer firm size (as defined below)
Firm-specific 
financial variables
Tobin's q Average of ratios: (MV + total liabilities) / total assets in 
the periods 1997-2000 and 2000-2003, respectively, in natural 
logarithm form
+ +
Δ Tobin's q Average of 1997-1999 (MV + total liabilities) / total 
assets  subtracted from same ratio 2000 and 
average of 2000-2002 (MV + total liabilities) / total 
assets  subtracted from same ratio 2003
+ +
Price / Sales Average of ratios: MV / revenues in the periods 1997-2000 
and 2000-2003, respectively, in natural logarithm form
+ +
Δ Price / Sales Average of 1997-1999 MV / revenues  subtracted from 
same ratio 2000 and 
average of 2000-2002 MV / revenues  subtracted from 
same ratio 2003
+ +
Cost of debt Average of ratios: effective annual interest payment / 
total debt in the periods  1997-2000 and 2000-2003, 
respectively, in natural logarithm form
- -
Δ Cost of debt Average of 1997-1999 effective annual interest payment / 
total debt subtracted from same ratio 2000 
average of 2000-2002 effective annual interest payment / 
total debt subtracted from same ratio 2003
- -
Z''-Score¹ Average of score in the periods 1997-2000 and 2000-2003, 
respectively
+ +
Δ Z''-Score Average of 1997-1999 Z''-Score subtracted from 2000 Z''-
Score and
average of 2000-2002 Z''-Score  subtracted from 2003 Z''-
Score
+ +
Cost of debt x Z''-Score Interaction variable with included averages of variables 
defined as above
+/- +/-
Tax reduction Average of ratios: income taxes / (pretax income x 
statutory tax rate) in the periods 1997-2000 and 2000-2003, 
respectively  
+ +
Internal funds Average of ratios: (Funds from operations - CAPEX) / 
total assets  in the periods 1997-2000 and 2000-2003, 
respectively
+ +
Cross-listing Dummy variable; equals 1 if company cross-listed on 
NYSE, NASDAQ or LSE in the periods 1997-2000 and 2000-
2003, respectively, 0 otherwise
+ +
Traditional non-
financial variables
Firm size Average of total assets  in the periods 1997-2000 and 2000-
2003, respectively, in natural logarithm form
+ NA
Knowledge intensity Average of ratio: total intangibles / total assets  in the 
periods 1997-2000 and 2000-2003, respectively
+ +/-
Capital intensity Average of ratio: NPPE / total assets  in the periods 1997-
2000 and 2000-2003, respectively
- +/-
Control variables Country variable Dummy variable; takes unit value if source country, 0 
otherwise
Industry variable Dummy variable; takes unit value if industry of acquirer, 0 
otherwise
¹ Z''-Score = 6,56 * (WC / TA) + 3,26 * (RE / TA) + 6,72 * (EBIT / TA) + 1,95 * (MV / TL);  with WC approxied by Current Assets - Current Liabilities
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